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A b stra ct
This thesis examines some strategic interactions between financial, 
labour and industrial contracts signed by the manager of a firm with 
different stakeholders. It investigates the strategic effects of contractual 
or institutional arrangements when the firm faces commitment problems.
The general introduction briefly surveys the relevant literatures on 
the methodology, modern theories of the firm, commitment problems 
and interactions between markets through the firm.
The second chapter focusses on interactions between labour markets 
and the market for corporate control. It argues that the possibility 
of takeovers may affect the economic consequences of union power in 
wage negotiations: while union power increases wage flexibility and the 
firm’s capacity to invest in the absence of takeovers, it decreases them 
when takeovers are allowed. Various takeover defence mechanisms are 
compared.
The third chapter analyzes the impact of competition among down­
stream firms on a supplier’s investment and on her incentive to verti­
cally integrate. Tougher competition decreases the downstream industry 
profit, but improves the supplier’s negotiation position. In particular, 
the supplier is better off encouraging competition when the downstream 
firms have high bargaining power. We analyze the interactions between 
downstream competition and vertical integration.
The fourth chapter (joint with Dr. Antoine Faure-Grimaud, LSE) 
analyzes the financing decisions of a monopolist facing a buyer whose 
valuation is private information. It develops the idea that a high level of 
(renegotiable) debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce 
the high valuation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase 
the monopolist’s expected profit. The benefit from the strategic use of 
debt increases with the durability of the good.
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1 T h e F irm  as a N ex u s  o f  C on tracts
Modern theories describe the firm as a nexus of contractual relationships. Ex­
plicit or implicit contracts are agreed upon either within firms, e.g. employment 
contracts, or outside them, e.g. supply contracts. The firm is the locus where 
those contracts meet and interact.
This thesis examines some strategic interactions between financial, labour 
and industrial contracts which may be signed within and by a firm. It investi­
gates the strategic effects of specific contractual or institutional arrangements 
when a firm faces commitment problems, namely the hold-up and Coasian 
commitment problems, Coasian dynamics and the ratchet effect.
By nature, the analysis of interactions is at the crossroads of several liter­
atures. This chapter briefly surveys modern theories of the firm and their link 
to the specific domains touched by the essays.
1.1 A B rief O verview
In the neoclassical paradigm, firms are production sets (black boxes) operated 
by a reliable profit-maximizing manager. While this model has been successful 
at analysing m arket outcomes, it did not explain the nature, boundaries and 
organisation of the firm. It ignored the way in which firms organise production 
and deal with conflicts of interest between different stakeholders. Modern 
theories of the firm emerged as an a ttem pt to open the black box.
The transaction costs theory, pioneered by Coase (1937) in his seminal 
paper, recognized tha t a large amount of resources was allocated inside the 
firm. In Coasian terms, such exchanges are characterized by a quantity mode 
rather than a price mode. Sometimes, the transaction costs when using a price 
mode (such as bargaining costs) are prohibitively high. Intra-firm  transactions 
may allow to save on such costs. The costs of intra-firm transactions, namely 
bureaucratic costs and the scope for errors, increase with the size of the firm 
and determine its boundaries.
However, a number of explanations was still needed. For instance, the costs 
of hiring other managers and delegate tasks to reduce these costs of operating 
the firm and the reasons why prices are less im portant within the firm than in 
the market were not addressed.
A few decades later, in the 1970s, Williamson proposed th a t firms exist 
because of relationship-specific investments. In other words, the higher cost of 
transaction in the market may be due to dynamic considerations (Williamson 
(1985)). For instance, an employee learns the workings of the organisation and 
the use of specific machines within a firm or an electricity-generating plant is 
located close to a coal mine. If the relationship stops, then (at least part of) 
the investment is lost. At the extreme, after the investment is made, there 
is bilateral monopoly. The fundamental question is when such relationships 
should be governed by long-term contracts between different firms and when 
they should take place within a firm. W riting long-term contracts may be com­
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plicated and costly. For instance, this requires to describe every contingency in 
a way which is understandable by the courts. These transaction costs may af­
fect the relationship. W hen writing a contingent clause becomes prohibitively 
costly, contracts may be left incomplete, leaving scope for future bargaining 
when unspecified events occur. Bargaining gives rise to im portant problems: 
under asymmetric information, the efficient outcome needs not obtain. In ad­
dition, the surplus may be split in a way th a t gives an insufficient return  to the 
initial investment. The la tter feature leads parties to underinvest ex ante. The 
so called the hold-up problem may lead parties to prefer less efficient but less 
specific investments in order to benefit from more competition between trading 
partners ex post. The question is to what extent integration may reduce this 
hold-up problem.
Grossman and Hart (1986) address this issue by distinguishing between hu­
man and physical assets. They assume th a t contracts are incomplete in th a t 
all uses of every physical asset cannot be specified in every state  of the world. 
They define property rights of the asset as the residual rights of control. In 
other words, the owner has the right to decide on the asset’s use in cases not 
specified in a prior contract. Hence, although the property right does not neces­
sarily give full bargaining power to a party  (the owner for instance), it specifies 
the status quo point in the bargaining game. Consider tha t two firms want 
to engage in relationship-specific investments. W hen should they integrate? 
Under non integration, bargaining over the surplus often leads to m oderate 
incentive to invest for both parties. In contrast, under integration, the firm 
buying (resp. bought by) the other can expect a large (small) surplus ex post 
and has therefore a high (resp. low) incentive to invest. According to the 
relative im portance of either investment in generating the surplus, integration 
has costs and benefits.
Grossman and H art’s seminal paper raises a number of questions. The 
definition of ownership as residual rights of control was in line with the law
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literature and was to offer a number of insights, but it was only a rough ap­
proximation of authority and control in organisations. In large organisations, 
some agents have some real authority in decision making even though they 
have no ownership right. Aghion and Tirole (1994) formalize the distinction 
between formal and real authority with asymmetric information. Although 
they have formal authority, owners may be better off delegating authority to 
more informed agents. The property right theory cannot address the separation 
of ownership and control because it defines one as the other. Distinguishing 
between formal and real authority may help explain this separation as well 
as partial integration. Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1996) investigate these 
issues and argue tha t the owner exerts effective control only if the costs of 
acquiring costly information are lower than the returns from using this infor­
mation. This is the case when she owns a sufficiently high fraction of return  
rights. In contrast, owning a sufficiently small fraction of return  rights may be 
a commitment not to acquire costly information and not to overrule the m an­
ager (in terms of vertical integration, the manager of the vertically integrated 
entity). Hence, the m anager’s initiative to seek profitable projects which are 
beneficial to him is fostered when ownership is dispersed1.
The activities and boundaries of the firm may also be affected by strategic 
considerations with product market competitors or various trading partners. 
Before turning to these topics which are central to this thesis, we discuss the 
hold-up problem which has received a lot of attention in the theory of the firm 
as well as the incomplete contracts methodology.
lrThe distinction between formal and real authority may also be thought of as a step 
towards combining Grossman and Hart’s theory of the firm with a theory defining ownership 
as return rights which give access to information (Cremer (1994)).
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1.2 T he H old-U p Problem  and D iscussion o f Contrac­
tual Solutions
Long term  contracts are often signed to enable parties to undertake efficient 
levels of relationship-specific investments. W hen contracts contingent on the 
level of investment or on future outcomes cannot be w ritten, each party  is to 
some extent locked-in once the investment has been sunk and is vulnerable 
to an opportunistic behaviour from the other parties. The anticipation of 
being victim  of opportunism  often leads parties to underinvest. The hold-up 
problem arises as soon as a party is not residual claimant on her investment. 
A number of authors have analysed the assumptions necessary to obtain the 
hold-up problem and possible contractual solutions.
Hart and Moore (1988) emphasize the role of information revelation and 
contract renegotiation in the hold-up problem. They characterize an optim al 
renegotiation design in the original contract under the assumption th a t there 
may or may not be trade, i.e. they focus on at will contracts. They build a 
model where the buyer’s valuation and seller’s cost of producing a homogeneous 
good are non verifiable and depend on their own investment and on the state 
of nature. Their timing is as follows:
• The contract is signed,
• investment levels chosen by the parties,
• state  of nature realized,
• revelation/renegotiation,
• trade takes place.
Once the state of nature is realized, messages can be sent to reveal infor­
mation or to help renegotiate. These messages may or may not be verifiable. 
A general underinvestm ent result obtains when no satisfactory outside option 
can be specified and when both parties invest.
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A recent literature investigates the extent to which mechanisms or contracts 
can solve the hold-up problem. This issue is central to literatures on both 
incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm. It questions when institutions 
emerging as a response to the hold-up problem m atter.
McLeod and Malcomson (1993) and Aghion et al (1994) propose contrac­
tual arrangem ents allowing for contract renegotiation and solving the hold-up 
problem2. They consider a two-agent relationship with a timing similar to Hart 
and Moore’s. McLeod and Malcomson focus on the verifiability assumptions of 
the state  of nature. They show tha t when there exists a rich enough verifiable 
partition of the set of states of natures, the use of escalatory clauses makes sure 
tha t investment levels are efficient. However, their assumption on verifiability 
would be hard to satisfy in a number of markets (where, for instance, it is 
impossible to refer to verifiable market prices).
Aghion et al (1994) show tha t the underinvestment problem can often be 
overcome by a contractual renegotiation design. They find tha t with risk- 
neutral agents, efficient investment can be achieved when the initial contract 
can specify a price-quantity pair as default option in case renegotiation fails 
or is unnecessary and assign all bargaining power to one party3: The default 
option gives, say the buyer, his first-best expected utility and induces him  to 
choose the first-best level of investment. In turn, the allocation of all bargaining 
power to the seller leads her to choose her first best level of investment (the 
seller gets all returns on her investment minus a fixed sum). The main difference 
with Hart and Moore is the assumption tha t courts can enforce contractually
2Rogerson (1992) considers complex full commitment contracts using mechanisms such 
as d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet’s or Cremer and Riordan’s. He shows that efficient levels 
of investment can be obtained with a variety of different informational assumptions when 
the agents are risk-neutral and there is no externality (each agent’s investment affect his own 
type only).
3This is formalized in an infinite horizon bargaining game with the initial contract speci­
fying both default options and either intial transfers refundable upon agreement or per diem 
transfers to be paid until an agreement is reached. These two instruments influence the 
parties’ relative degree of impatience and thus their bargaining powers and can ensure that 
one party is residual claimant.
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specified levels of trade.
Aghion et al exhibit sufficient conditions for efficient bilateral investment 
in the presence of renegotiation and one sided externalities. However, b ilat­
eral direct externalities generally lead to underinvestment since the party with 
full bargaining power does not internalize any direct externality. Their results 
might also explain why efficiency may fail to hold in practice. A part from 
bounded rationality, there may be legal problems of enforceability making effi­
cient renegotiation design impossible. Legal problems in enforcing a status quo 
level of trade may be particularly acute in employer/employee relationships. 
Hence, institutional design may m atter.
1.3 On Incom plete Contracts
Closely related to W illiamson’s and Grossman and H art’s theories are the idea 
tha t tha t transaction costs lead parties to leave gaps in contracts. These gaps 
are a key ingredient to the importance of authority, control and ownership4 
There are few economists to question tha t contracts are incomplete, even 
though they may be very sophisticated. Few would also contest the usefulness 
of this methodology in developing intuitions and analysing economic institu­
tions. However, worries have arisen about the need for more robust foundations 
for the literature on incomplete contracts. Indeed, rigorous foundations may 
require a theory of bounded rationality which is not available yet. Such foun­
dations are not within the scope of this thesis. This subsection only discusses 
recent contributions, most of which are masterfully discussed and developed 
in Tirole (1994). It may be thought of as a caveat on the limitations of the 
methodology used in the incomplete contracts literature and in the next chap­
ters.
An im portant characteristic of complete contracts is tha t the cost of de­
signing perfectly contingent contracts is asymmetric information. The ability
4However, it has recently appeared that these notions can sometimes be formalized with 
complete contracts (Tirole (1994)).
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to foresee contingencies and to write and enforce contracts have no lim itation. 
The defenders of incomplete contracts have first tried to relax these assump­
tions.
Various arguments have been used to justify contractual incompleteness. 
One is th a t it may be impossible to know in advance all possible contingencies. 
It appears th a t this approach may not be consistent with traditional models 
which typically analyse contracts between rational expected utility maximizers 
who know at least the set of possible payoffs. Tirole (1994), in joint work with 
Eric Maskin, shows tha t in a wide range of circumstances, there exists a mech­
anism with unforeseen contingencies and foreseen payoffs th a t implements the 
ex post efficient allocation which would be attained under complete contracts.
Another approach is to emphasize writing and enforcement costs. These 
costs are often formalized by assuming tha t some variable is observable to the 
stakeholders, but not verifiable to the courts. In other words, there is asym­
metric information between the stakeholders and the courts. However, this 
situation boils down to a symmetric information im plem entation or a m ulti­
agent moral hazard problem. In these situations, a contract contingent on non 
verifiable information which is observed by the stakeholders can often be im ­
plemented (Moore (1992)) or unncessary (Aghion et al (1994)). An implicit 
assumption may be tha t such implementation mechanisms are accompanied by 
high measurement or complexity costs. Measurement costs are already included 
in the complete contract paradigm and do not imply contract incompleteness, 
but they may lead to outcomes which look like incomplete contract ones5. O pti­
mal complete contracts are often complex which implies tha t their robustness 
can be questioned (see Hart and Holmstrom (1987) and Moore (1992)). In 
contrast, traditionnal models of incomplete contracts do not require the use of 
complex mechanisms. However, complexity costs and robustness are difficult 
to formalize. Given tha t these models of incomplete contracts still use ingredi­
5Tirole (1994) discusses the examples of career concerns developed by Holmstrom (1982) 
and Gibbons and Murphy (1992) which rule out the measurement of performance.
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ents from rational expectations, rigorous foundations are still a challenge (see 
Anderlini and Felli (1994) for a contribution based on algorithms). Another 
direction has been to obtain contractual incompleteness from renegotiation or 
other collusion constraints. Tirole (1994), in joint work with Aghion, devel­
ops an example of innovation whose outcomes are characterised by unknown 
payoffs where an optimal complete contract can be implemented by a random 
allocation of property rights.
Despite all these difficulties, few would contest the usefulness of incomplete 
contracts in guiding intuitions on the workings of organisations. However, 
another im portant critique (related to the discussion above) is tha t contrac­
tual incompleteness may give a large freedom to economic modellers. Non 
variability may sometimes be an assumption ad hoc and should be carefully 
justified. This may look reasonable when referring to an effort or a profit sub­
ject to accounting manipulations, but there is little empirical work examining 
the verifiability of variables. Authors have tried to develop an analysis of or­
ganisations in sticking to similar informational and contractual assumptions. 
This methodology, used by Laffont and M artim ort (1996), has the advantage 
of developing a very coherent framework.
Laffont and M artim ort’s starting point is the revelation principle, one of 
the m ajor results of contract theory. This principle states th a t under stan­
dard informational assumptions the party offering a contract, the principal, 
can restrict her analysis to cases where the agent announces his information. 
W ith the revelation principle, standard contract theory addresses conflicts of 
interests between different parties, but not the analysis of organisations as the 
principal can always include all activities in a single contract. Laffont and 
M artim ort examine organisations by relaxing assumptions necessary to ob­
tain the revelation principle. In their framework, contractual incompleteness 
comes from communication costs between principals and problems in enforcing 
side contracts between other members of the organisation. The multiprincipal
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analysis assumes tha t communication costs prevent various principals who can 
contract on a limited and different subset of the activities of the organisation 
from coordinating in their contract offers.
1.4 Interactions B etw een  Financial and Industrial/L abour  
C ontracts
The recent theoretical literature on the interactions between financial and in­
dustrial/labour contracts is concerned with analysing of a nexus of contracts. 
Most of the contributions deal with the strategic use of contracts by firms ei­
ther in an imperfect competition setup or facing a commitment problem in rent 
extraction.
The first category was pioneered by Brander and Lewis’ (1986) paper argu­
ing tha t in a duopoly competing in quantities, debt induces firms to compete 
more aggressively by convexifying the firms’ objective function via the lim­
ited liability effect. This paper, however, takes the debt contract as given 
and does not consider renegotiation6. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) provide 
a seminal analysis of predation via a deep-pocket argument with an optimal 
renegotiation-proof debt contract. Faure-Grimaud (1995) shows th a t this opti­
mal renegotiation-proof debt contract leads firms to compete less aggressively, 
a result more consistent with empirical evidence (see, amongst others, Cheva­
lier (1995a)). Faure-Grimaud (1995) also surveys the literature on imperfect 
competition with financial constraints.
This thesis is more concerned with the second category which was pioneered 
by T itm an’s (1984) contribution on the financing decision of a durable good 
monopolist. T itm an’s point is tha t debt increases the probability of bankruptcy 
and hence the expected value of after-sale services. Hence, buyers are more 
reluctant to buy the durable good and decreases the value of the firm7. Al-
6In the same vein, Maksimovic (1988) argues that, in a repeated oligopoly game, debt 
affects the firms’ ability to collude.
7In the same spirit, Maksimovic and Titman (1991) consider situations where debt alters 
firms’ credibility in offering high-quality products and hence decreases the value of the firm.
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though this point is certainly relevant and is consistent with some empirical 
evidence (T itm an and Wessels (1988)), T itm an abstracts from the durable 
good monopolist pricing problem. This is the subject of the final chapter of 
this thesis.
W ithin the theoretical works on the linkages between firms’ financial struc­
ture and their behaviour in input and output markets, recent papers study how 
a high level of debt can be used as a bargaining tool by the shareholders in 
the wage negotiation with a union. Perotti and Spier (1993) argue tha t since a 
high level of debt commits the shareholders not to undertake some profitable 
investments, their own incentives to invest are ruined unless the workers agree 
to renegotiate their wage contracts. Therefore, a high level of debt can be used 
strategically to induce the union to renegotiate wage contracts. Some debt for 
equity performs achieve this strategic role whenever current returns are so low 
that the workers (or more generally the creditors) must rely on the surplus 
generated by future investments for full payment. Anticipating this, the work­
ers obtain a higher initial wage contract, which is inefficient because they are 
risk-averse and they bear the risk8. This paper, however, does not focus on the 
real effects of union power which are analysed in Chapter 2.
In contrast, Sarig (1992) argues tha t the workers’ firm-specific human cap­
ital can lead the union to obtain higher wages when the debt level is high. In 
his paper, given tha t the experienced employees are more productive than the 
unexperienced ones, the shareholders of highly levered firms are more sensitive 
to employees’ threats to seek alternative employment than shareholders of less 
levered firms: given tha t there are more states leading to bankruptcy and so 
to zero-profit for the shareholders, the value of their disagreement outcome is 
lower. However, Sarig only focuses on the shareholders’ interest. He does not
8There is a legal restriction since it is usually illegal to sign a contract where the firm 
withdraws capital knowing she will not be able to respect the existing wage contract. How­
ever, this argument holds in other situations where the courts cannot act in such a way, that 
is non verifiable contracts or manipulations.
18
consider th a t in a dynamic context, this argument implies th a t the workers 
may accept a lower initial wage, which can be, as we saw, very im portant both 
for efficiency and for the maximization of the value of the firm9.
The next chapters analyse the way financial contracts and ownership issues 
affect commitment problems, namely the hold-up, Coasian commitment and 
dynamic adverse selection (Coasian dynamics and ratchet effect) problems. In 
doing so, they take different approaches of the theory of the firm. The second 
chapter takes a Williamsonian point of view in tha t it focuses on hold-up 
problems but not property rights. The third chapter considers an approach 
of property rights in the style of Grossman and Hart (1986) (more precisely 
Hart and Tirole (1990)) although the positive effect of competition is related 
to the Williamsonian idea th a t firms may want to deal with a competitive 
m arket to be protected from opportunism. The fourth chapter focuses on 
the nexus of contracts in a dynamic adverse selection context like Laffont and 
M artim ort (1996), but it uses an optimal debt contract with a usual contractual 
incompleteness. The commitment problems on which we shall focus and the 
approach adopted in the next chapters are the subject of the next sections.
2 T h e H old -U p  P rob lem  w ith  C orp orate  G ov­
ern an ce Issues
This section examines the hold-up problem while analysing the real effects of 
union power in the absence or the presence of a takeover threat. We show 
that a p a rty ’s investment may well decrease with her bargaining power when 
takeovers are possible.
9Moreover, he assumes that bankruptcy leads to liquidation and does not give the possi­
bility of reorganization to the shareholders.
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2.1 T he Econom ic Consequences o f U nion Power
Grout (1984) formalizes the widespread idea tha t unions increase labour costs 
and lead firms to underinvest. When union power increases, the share of the 
surplus th a t the firm appropriates from its investment decreases. Hence, its 
investment decreases. In G rout’s setup, the return  is a function of the firm’s 
investment. The only role of unions is to appropriate a share of this surplus. 
This opportunism  from the union does not compensate any kind of (non con­
tractible) investment or desirable activity.
Chapter 2 allows the surplus to increase with some investment from the 
workers as well. This investment may be either an effort or a wage concession 
made to allow the firm to increase a financially constrained investment. First, 
in the simple case where the surplus depends on the workers’ effort only, a 
simple formalization of the hold-up problem shows tha t this effort and hence 
the surplus increases with union power. W hen the initial labour market is 
imperfect, however, the firm appropriates a smaller share of this surplus and 
may be either be tter off or worse off with a higher union power.
Second, in the case where the surplus only depends on a financially con­
strained investment from the firm, a higher union power ensures tha t workers 
are ready to make a tem porary wage concession aiming at increasing the firm ’s 
investment. A wage concession is understood as an investment from the firm 
which is all the more profitable as union power is high. Hence, a simple analogy 
with the hold-up problem casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that union 
power reduces wage flexibility. A more powerful union will appropriate a larger 
share from the surplus from investment. Therefore, the incentive to make a 
wage concession in order to allow the firm to increase its investment is higher. 
This implies tha t wage flexibility increases with union power10. In addition, a 
financially constrained firm invests all the more as union power is high due to
10For instance, German unions’ power may induce them to agree on substantial real wage 
concessions in bad times (Financial Times (1994)) because they are confident they can secure 
benefits in future good times.
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a higher wage flexibility or a higher effort from the workers. We shall see that 
these results may not hold when there may be a takeover.
2.2 U nion Power and Takeovers
We now tu rn  to the strategic use of financial manipulations to extract rents 
from unions. The business press is swarming with examples of managers lead­
ing their firm to financial distress to renegotiate wages down. The corporate 
raider Lorenzo tried to take over firms in order to force workers to renegotiate 
their wages down. He repeatedly failed to obtain wage concessions as well as 
motivation to provide good services from the workers from his companies. A 
particularly illustrative example can be found in Lorenzo’s raids on TWA in 
1985 and Eastern Airlines in 1986. The unions approached a white knight to 
whom they promised substantial wage concessions to induce him to overbid 
Lorenzo. In particular, TW A’s unions offered 300 million dollars to Carl Icahn 
who bought the firm (see Bernstein (1990))11.
Shleifer and Summers (1988) point out tha t hostile takeovers may take 
place in order to breach implicit (or self-enforcing) contracts in the target 
firm12. They argue that the rationale only applies for hostile takeovers because 
incumbent managers are committed to respect implicit contracts. Thus, the 
takeover must be “hostile” as the incumbent manager must be sacked for the 
new shareholders to benefit from the breach of implicit contracts. Holmstrom 
(1988) further argues tha t only a manager with a reputation for toughness 
would obtain wage concessions in bad times.
11Clearly, this type of argument is not limited to employer/employee relationships. In the 
same vein, the recent spin-off of British Gas in two entities may have been realized for a rent 
extraction purpose. British Gas is now split into two entities: one with profitable businesses 
and one with the non profitable ones and to which a contract with North Sea gas producers 
was attached. The rationale behind this spin-off was to force these producers to renegotiate 
these long-term contracts to the advantage of British Gas.
12Long-term relationships are often governed by a sequence of shorter term contracts. 
The expected outcome of the subsequent (re)negotiation contracting games affects ex ante 
investment levels and more generally self-enforcing, i.e. implicit, agreements. Although 
implicit contracts are often formalized with reputation effects, we shall instead understand 
them as the expectation of future bargaining outcomes.
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C hapter 2 begins with a very simple observation which is to be contrasted 
with Shleifer and Summers (1988) and Holmstrom (1988). A priori, only a 
manager who can commit to leave rents to unions in the future may obtain 
more wage concessions (or any other investment). However, we further show 
that the presence of a takeover threat may make a tough manager obtain more 
wage concession than a soft one. The intuition is as follows: a tough raider 
will take over the firm only if the cost of doing so is lower than  the gains from 
breaching implicit contracts. W hen the incumbent manager is soft, the gains 
from breaching implicit contracts are high and the incentive for a raider to take 
over the firm is high. Thus, when the incumbent m anager’s bargaining power 
increases, a higher effort or a wage concession can be made without triggering 
a takeover. The workers’ effort and wage flexibility may decrease with union 
power.
A further result of the next chapter is tha t the workers may be willing to 
make wage concessions in order to prevent a takeover led by a tough raider. 
Since they anticipate to have higher rents from the incumbent manager, they 
are ready to make more concessions under him than under the raider13. Simi­
larly, when the incumbent manager is tough and when this implies a cost higher 
than the takeover cost, the workers may offer a soft possible manager, i.e. a 
white knight, a substantial tem porary wage concession to give him an incentive 
to buy. Such a wage concession may not take place when the takeover cost is 
too high, the workers face a wealth constraint (and credit rationing) or a co­
ordination failure (so tha t a subsequent free rider problem among the workers 
cannot be solved) or when they want to build a reputation for refusing wage 
concessions.
13The takeover threat allowing a transfer from the workers to the shareholders may increase 
the firm’s investment as well as the stage A wage.
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3 W h en  D o e s  a M on o p o ly  Supp lier w ant to  
R ed u ce  D ow n stream  C om p etition ?
The nexi of contracts have also proved very useful in analysing vertically re­
lated m arkets, the efficiency consequences of vertical restraints and competition 
policy. This section discusses the argument tha t a monopoly supplier facing 
a Coasian commitment problem wants to reduce downstream competition. It 
further investigates the interactions between the incentive for vertical integra­
tion and downstream competition.
3.1 Foreclosure and Vertical Integration
Foreclosure on vertically related markets by firms with market power has been 
a hotly debated issue. Foreclosure occurs when a dominant firm restricts access 
to an essential input to some downstream firms “with the intent of extending 
monopoly power from one segment of the market [...] to the o ther” (Rey and 
Tirole (1996)).
An im portant intuition behind this argument is tha t the use of vertical 
restraints allows a monopoly supplier to appropriate the downstream industry 
profit. If the supplier could not use vertical restraints and was forced to charge 
linear prices (and meet the demand at tha t price), the supplier would generally 
be better off with a competitive downstream industry requiring a large quantity 
of input. However, the use of (price) discrimination, vertical integration and 
non linear tariffs may allow the supplier to increase the downstream industry 
profit and appropriate it.
A recent theoretical literature has focused on the analysis of the nexus of 
contracts in such a framework to understand and formalize foreclosure. In this 
section, we restrict ourselves to Hart and Tirole’s (1990) formalization, and to 
the role of vertical integration in facilitating foreclosure14.
14Foreclosure may also, for instance, arise for an insurance motive when downstream firms 
compete for inputs in limited supply (Bolton and W hinston (1993) and Emons (1996)).
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The basic framework in Hart and Tirole (1990) and Rey and Tirole (1996) 
is as follows: a monopoly supplier can supply two downstream firms com pet­
ing on both the input and output markets. The supplier initially proposes a 
menu contract to each downstream firm which orders a quantity against the 
payment of a tariff. Then, the downstream firms transform  the input, observe 
each o ther’s output and compete in quantities. In the absence of informational 
problems between downstream firms, the fact tha t the contract offers are made 
by the supplier would allow her to appropriate the whole downstream indus­
try  profit. Hence, only the monopoly quantity would be produced. A crucial 
feature of their model is tha t the supplier’s contract offers to a downstream 
firm are not observable to the other downstream firms. Together with other 
contractual and behavioral assumptions, this implies tha t in equilibrium the 
supplier sells the Cournot quantity to the downstream industry. If she claimed 
to sell half of the monopoly quantity to each downstream firm against the 
payment of half of the monopoly profit, she would be better off secretly rene­
gotiating this agreement ex post in order to sell additional units. Although she 
would be bette r off restricting her production to the monopoly quantity, the 
secrecy of transactions creates a commitment problem. Since the downstream 
firms anticipate tha t the supplier will sell the Cournot quantity, the transfers 
to the supplier are reduced15. Hence, the supplier would be better off facing a 
monopolistic downstream industry16. W hen the number of downstream firms 
increases, the cost to the supplier of her commitment problem increases.
Vertical integration may solve this commitment problem and allow the sup­
plier to supply the monopoly quantity and foreclose the downstream market. 
W hen the supplier owns one downstream firm, her return  rights lead her to
15This commitment problem is closely related to the Coasian dynamics, i.e. the durable 
good monopolist pricing problem, that we shall see in the next section and in Chapter 4. 
Rey and Tirole (1996) carefully analyse this analogy and refer to the present problem as the 
Coasian commitment problem.
16In the case where the supplier must invest initially, she thus faces a hold-up problem  
from both the downstream firms and the final consumers which is aggravated by her own 
impossibility to commit not to act in an opportunistic way.
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internalize the cost to her subsidiary of flooding other downstream firms with 
the input. In this case, the benefit from vertical integration increases with 
competition in the downstream industry.
3.2 On th e Incentive to  Favour C om petition
Chapter 3 is concerned with analysing to what extent the use of vertical re­
straints induces a monopoly supplier to reduce competition in the downstream 
industry. It further derives an application to vertical integration as a function 
of the competitive environment in the downstream industry.
The chapter begins with the observation tha t a supplier may not have 
all bargaining power with the downstream firms even though those compete 
for the input. For instance, the mere threat of appearance of an alternative 
source of supply would make the supplier impatient to sign a contract with 
the downstream firms, which would increase the downstream firms’ bargaining 
power. The supplier may even be better off ex ante with downstream firms 
with some bargaining power to guarantee them  a payoff which is high enough 
not to invest to find out an alternative source of supply.
Hence, the use of vertical restraints allows the supplier to appropriate only 
part of the downstream industry output. This would still make her better off 
with a monopolistic downstream industry. However, chapter three shows that 
competition may still be valuable to the supplier to improve her negotiation 
position: since the downstream firms have some bargaining power, the expected 
bargaining outcome depends on their offer to the supplier when negotiating. 
Furthermore, when they can neither coordinate nor observe the transactions 
between the supplier and their competitors, the downstream firms offers equal 
the supplier’s marginal cost of producing the units they offer. W hen they 
compete for the input and the supplier’s marginal cost is increasing, more 
competition leads to a higher expected quantity and thus to higher offers to 
the supplier. W hen downstream firms’ bargaining power is high enough, the
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supplier is therefore bette r off with fiercer downstream competition.
Chapter three applies this approach to derive a theory of vertical integration 
based on the competitive environment. It is assumed tha t vertical integration 
comes with an agency cost. As in Hart and Tirole (1990), vertical integration 
commits the supplier to sell the monopoly quantity only and allows her to 
appropriate the monopoly surplus whatever the supplier’s bargaining power. 
W hen the supplier’s bargaining power is low (resp. high), this benefit is higher 
than the cost of integration if the downstream m arket is competitive (resp. 
concentrated) enough.
Ex ante, the possibility of vertical integration has im portant repercussions 
on market structure. Namely, entry in the downstream industry may be re­
stricted and horizontal mergers or spin-offs may be observed.
Firm s’ incentives to promote competition in vertically related m arkets is ob­
served in practice. For instance, Rey and Tirole (1996) describe how a change 
in regulation led AT&T to divest its supplier AT&T Technology. This decision 
is thought to be m otivated by the desire to promote competition: Divesting 
may have been a commitment not to have favored relationships and to discrim­
inate against competing firms. Favored relationships might have led competing 
firms to engage in long-term relationships with other suppliers. Divesting was 
meant to favour AT&T’s and AT&T Technology’s development and thus maybe 
a profitable strategy. Firm s’ incentives to promote competition in vertically 
related markets may also help to improve the efficiency of competition policy.
4 D y n a m ic  A d verse  S e lectio n  and th e  S tra te ­
gic U se  o f  D eb t
The two preceding sections (and the next two chapters) are concerned with 
the role of some institutions in (so called moral hazard) problems where rent 
extraction may lead to underinvestment. We now turn  to another type of 
problem where the payoff to a monopolist is constrained by the (single) buyer’s
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private information about his valuation for the good. We investigate how the 
strategic use of debt may increase the m onopolist’s payoff.
4.1 D ynam ic A dverse Selection
In this subsection, we describe im portant features of dynamic adverse selec­
tion and present the two most famous adverse selection problems, namely the 
ratchet effect and the durable good monopolist pricing problem. For simplicity, 
we restrict ourselves to the case where the buyer may only be of two types, 
high and low.
As a benchmark, the analysis of the static case where the monopolist can 
make contract offers only once typically leads to the following results (see 
Maskin and Riley (1984)). The high valuation buyer buys the first best allo­
cation and benefits from an informational rent, while the low valuation buyer 
buys a suboptim al quantity and has no rent. The m onopolist’s payoff is con­
strained by the fact tha t the high valuation buyer may benefit from the contract 
aimed at the low valuation one and is thus led to leave him an informational 
rent.
Furthermore, the m onopolist’s payoff is generally limited by other con­
straints in long term  relationships when she can make different contract offers 
over time. Namely, the buyer’s response to the initial contract offers provides 
the monopolist with some information about the buyer’s valuation. The mo­
nopolist can exploit this information when making the subsequent contract 
offers. More particularly, this information may allow her to reduce the high 
valuation buyer’s informational rent. Therefore, it is costly for the high val­
uation buyer to reveal his type at an early stage. This implies th a t at each 
stage the contract offers are subject to the constraint tha t the high valuation 
buyer’s expected rent from not revealing information is lower than the utility 
from revealing information now.
Research in dynamic adverse selection has been guided by the famous Coase
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conjecture (Coase (1972)). Now well formalized (in a dynamic adverse selec­
tion model by Hart and Tirole (1988)), this durable good monopolist pricing 
problem comes from the buyer’s expectation th a t the monopolist will decrease 
her price over time. In the case of one buyer with private information and unit 
demand, the high valuation buyer may want to mimick the low valuation one 
and wait for a subsequent decrease in price (due to the m onopolist’s updated 
beliefs) before buying. In other words, the monopolist competes with herself 
over time.
This competition over time is also a feature of the ratchet effect. This effect 
may be thought of either the rental situation of the durable good or the sale of 
a non durable one. It simply comes from the high valuation buyer’s expectation 
tha t buying the good at a high price at an early stage will reveal his type and 
lead the monopolist to charge high prices in the future.
4.2 P otentia l Solutions and the Strategic U se o f D ebt
The Coase conjecture has been a very popular theme in the industrial organi­
zation literature over the last decades. Several solutions have been proposed 
to limit the intertem poral competition faced by the monopolist.
Ex ante, the monopolist may want to commit in a long-term contract to 
stick to the static contract offers all along the relationship and replicate her 
static payoff. However, this is impossible in a wide range of situations. First, 
long-term contracts may come with substantial costs and the sequence of short­
term  contracts will be subject to the constraint mentioned above. Second, even 
when long-term contracts are signed at an early stage, they may be subject to 
renegotiation (Laffont and Tirole (1993)) the outcome of which depends on the 
information revealed to the monopolist. One may be tem pted to think th a t it 
is possible to commit to a certain behaviour with a third party. However, such 
a commitment would also be subject to renegotiation.
It has also been pointed out tha t leasing a durable good allows her to evade
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the Coase conjecture. However, leasing is subject to moral hazard issues on 
the demand side. Another idea is tha t the monopolist may destroy his factory 
after today’s production to commit not to flood the market in the future. This 
solution is only appropriate in a situation with several potential buyers. In 
the case of one buyer with unit valuation, once the good is produced, only the 
price at which it will be sold m atters and the commitment not to flood the 
m arket is unim portant. Moreover, the monopolist could produce the durable 
good with another factory.
The final chapter, joint with Antoine Faure-Grimaud (LSE), goes somewhat 
further into this last direction. We argue th a t debt is a mechanism which 
ensures tha t the firm is liquidated if a high valuation buyer does not buy the 
good, which forces this high valuation buyer to reveal his type early.
This role of debt in favouring the elicitation of information holds because 
inefficient renegotiation implies tha t the commitment with the th ird party (the 
lender) is credible. It is sufficient for the monopolist to be so financially con­
strained th a t the buyer’s decision not to reveal his information early leads to 
cash constrained and thus inefficient debt renegotiation implying liquidation. 
This leads to the somewhat provocative result that a higher level of debt may 
decrease the probability of inefficient liquidation.
The final chapter also investigates a number of applications. In particular, 
the advantage of the strategic use of debt is higher the fiercer the competition 
that the monopolist faces with herself over time, that is the higher the durabil­
ity of the good. This point is to be contrasted with T itm an’s (1984) argument 
that a high level of debt, by increasing the probability of liquidation, decreases 
the expected value of after-sale services and hence buyers’ willingness to buy 
the good and the value of the firm. Dynamic adverse selection issues may well 
have been overlooked in the literature on the interactions between financial 
and industrial contracts.
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Chapter 2
Implicit Contracts, Union Power 
and Takeovers
A b stra c t
This chapter studies the economic consequences of union power in 
wage negotiations. It argues that the effects of union power are very 
sensitive to the possibility of takeovers. In the absence of takeovers, the 
wage flexibility and the workers’ effort are shown to increase with the 
union power. Hence, when the employer must invest, there are costs 
and benefits of union power. Under the threat of a takeover reducing 
the expected wages, the workers’ effort and wage flexibility are restricted 
and they decrease with the initial union power. Various takeover defence 
mechanisms are compared.
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1 In tro d u ctio n
This chapter develops a theory of costs and benefits of union power in wage 
negotiations. It points out tha t union power may have very different effects 
depending on whether takeovers are possible or not. We claim th a t in the 
absence of takeovers, union power can enhance wage flexibility and the workers’ 
incentives to work, but reduce the firm’s incentive to invest. For instance, 
we suggest th a t German unions’ power allows them  to agree on substantial 
real wage concessions in bad times (Financial Times (1994)) because they are 
confident they can secure benefits in future good times. However, under a 
takeover th rea t, the workers’ effort and wage flexibility may decrease with the 
union’s bargaining power: the higher the latter, the higher the incentive for a 
raider to take over the firm to renege on future wages. Thus, when the union’s 
power decreases, a higher effort or a wage concession can be made without 
triggering a takeover. Examples of strategic unions’ actions with raiders can 
be found in the US airline industry1.
Assume tha t an entrepreneur runs a project whose future return  increases 
with a non contractible and (partly) firm-specific effort from a worker. Sup­
pose th a t this long-term relationship is governed by a sequence of short-term  
contracts. The expected negotiation of the future short-term  contracts affects 
ex ante investments and more generally self-enforcing, i.e. implicit, contracts2.
1The tough raider Lorenzo repeatedly failed to obtain wage concessions and good services 
from the workers of airlines companies he took over. In particular, after his raids on TWA 
in 1985 and Eastern Airlines in 1986, the unions did not only refuse to make concessions, 
but also looked for a white knight. They promised him substantial wage concessions against 
his overbidding Lorenzo. This succeeded for TWA where Icahn was offered 300 million 
dollars by the unions, could overbid Lorenzo and finally bought the firm. This failed for 
Eastern Airlines where Lorenzo demanded an unacceptable price. Later on, the Lorenzo 
empire collapsed (see Bernstein (1990)). Icahn was less tough than Lorenzo, but not very 
soft either.
2 Reputation effects can help sustain implicit labour contracts in which the workers make a 
non verifiable effort against the promise of a future payment by their employer (Bull (1987)). 
By reneging on her promise, the employer would harm her reputation so that workers would 
be reluctant to engage into such agreements in the future. On implicit contracts, see also 
Hart and Holmstrom (1987).
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More specifically, the entrepreneur may be better off having a weak bargain­
ing power, i.e. being soft3: anticipating a larger share of future profits, the 
worker is ready to invest more via a higher effort and a larger wage concession. 
Conversely, under a strong bargainer, the hold-up problem is more severe: the 
worker does not expect much from the future and invests less.
Symmetrically, when the return increases with a non contractible invest­
ment from the entrepreneur, a union’s bargaining power th a t is too high in­
duces the entrepreneur to underinvest. There is a tradeoff (from both  the en­
trepreneur’s and the social point of view) between the increased cost of labour 
restricting the firm ’s investment and the benefits of a higher wage flexibility and 
more investment from the worker. A socially optim al bargaining power would 
maximize the social surplus under the constraints th a t each party  chooses her 
investment so as to maximize her payoff. Hence, we have costs and benefits of 
union power.
However, the sustainability of implicit labour contracts is constrained by 
the possibility of takeovers aimed at earning from reducing future wages. Once 
the investments are sunk, a tougher raider would earn more when bargaining 
than the incumbent entrepreneur. This gives the former an incentive to take 
over the firm. W hen the takeover is costly, the worker restricts his effort either 
to a level th a t prevents the takeover when possible or otherwise to a level tha t is 
compatible with the tough raider running the firm. Preventing the takeover can 
even require an effort tha t is lower than accommodating it. W hen the surplus 
becomes low, the worker is better off making a wage concession conditional 
upon the incumbent entrepreneur keeping control. Furtherm ore, under the 
threat of a takeover, the worker’s effort and wage flexibility increase with the 
incumbent entrepreneur’s bargaining power: increasing the la tte r reduces the 
the incentive to take over the firm.
3In what follows, we shall use either soft or weak and either tough or strong since we study 
a trivial case of reputation: a strong entrepreneur cannot commit not to use her bargaining 
strength, i.e. not to be tough.
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Takeover defence mechanisms can help sustain implicit contracts. However, 
when potential raiders have different valuations which are not verifiable, anti­
takeover defences should be endogenous and therefore implicit. W ritten anti­
takeover contracts increasing the takeover cost are too rigid to satisfy this 
condition and introduce inefficiencies: they cannot at the same tim e allow all 
desirable takeovers and protect implicit contracts. Giving the worker the right 
to reject the takeover increases flexibility, but may protect inefficient implicit 
contracts, i.e. may allow the worker to maintain too high his bargaining power.
Our results on the impact of union power in the absence of takeovers are 
to be contrasted with Grout (1984). In G rout’s setup, the profit as a function 
of the investment from the firm only makes union power reduce the firm’s 
investment. In his setup, the main role of union power is to take away from 
the firm a larger share of the profit and lead her to underinvest. Here, we argue 
tha t the profit may well depend on an investment from the workers as well. In 
this case, a higher union power increases wage flexibility and the effort from the 
worker, which in turn  may increase both the surplus and the profit. W hen the 
firm is financially constrained, her investment may increase with union power 
via either a higher wage flexibility or a higher effort from the worker. More 
generally, the idea tha t a principal may benefit from giving power to an agent 
has recently received a lot of attention. Aghion and Tirole (1994) show that 
to delegate authority may foster the agent’s initiative. Burkart, Gromb and 
Panunzi (1995) and Habib (1994) independently developed arguments th a t a 
dispersed ownership can commit shareholders to free ride and respectively not 
to acquire information which may be used to overrule a manager and not to 
renege upon the promises of deferred compensation to workers. The m anager’s 
and workers’ efforts thus decrease as the ownerhip becomes more dispersed. 
Our arguments, however, concern the effects of expected bargaining outcomes 
(rather than those of authority or free riding) on several aspects of economic 
activity.
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Concerning takeovers, the chapter is related to Shleifer and Summ ers’ 
(1988) argument th a t the gains in hostile takeovers may derive from the breach 
of implicit contracts in the target firm. The authors assume th a t the incumbent 
managers are committed to respect implicit contracts4. Holmstrom (1988)’s 
comment supports their point tha t a manager with a reputation for softness 
will not be able to obtain drastic concessions when necessary and th a t she must 
be replaced for the firm to obtain wage concessions. In contrast, our starting 
point is th a t when the outcome of future negotiations are at stake, only an en­
trepreneur who can commit not to be tough in the future can a priori change 
her negotiation position and obtain more concessions from the union when this 
can increase profits. Under takeover threats, however, the workers may work 
more and be better off working with a sufficiently tough incumbent manager. 
They may also benefit from giving away power to the incumbent manager. This 
suggests th a t the decline of unions in the US and the UK in the past decades 
may be positively correlated with the deregulation of financial markets leading 
to more takeovers in these countries.
Section 2  presents the model. Section 3 studies the effect of future wage ne­
gotiations on the worker’s effort and wage flexibility and on the entrepreneur’s 
incentive to invest. Section 4 analyzes the impact of takeovers and takeover 
defence mechanisms on the worker’s effort. Section 5 concludes.
2 T h e  M o d el
An entrepreneur wants to undertake a two-stage project:
• in stage A, a worker is hired at wage w a and exerts an effort e E 1R+ at 
cost c(e) =  e.
4Thus, the bidder must sack the incumbent manager, i.e. the takeover must be “hostile” , 
in order to renege on the implicit contracts. We shall argue in the conclusion that friendly 
takeovers may also lead to a breach of trust. This is consistent with empirical studies 
(Lichtenberg and Siegel (1989), Rosett (1990)).
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•  in stage B, the two parties bargain over a wage w b  and sign a wage 
contract. Then, a return g(e)  is generated and the worker receives w b -
The entrepreneur’s and worker’s objective functions are respectively 7r =  
g(e)  — wa  — wb  and wa  +  wb  — e. Let wo be the worker’s outside opportunity 
wage in each stage5. We shall call wq— wa  the wage flexibility6. For simplicity, 
the labour market in stage A will be considered as perfectly competitive unless 
otherwise specified. The worker does not consume before the end of stage B. 
We assume th a t the worker can costlessly be induced to work in stage B. There 
is no discounting.
The return  function g is twice differentiable with g' >  0, g n <  0 and 
g \Q ) =  + 0 0 . For convenience, note /(e )  =  g(e)  — w 0 and assume tha t / (0 )  =  0. 
The project is profitable7:
3e  6  IR+, g(e)  >  2w0 +  e (1)
A ssu m p tio n  1 : The effort is (at least partly) f irm  specific and not con­
tractible.
If the effort was not (at least partly) firm-specific, the worker could play the 
entrepreneur against another firm and appropriate the whole surplus created. 
There are many reasons why the effort may not be contractible. For instance, 
the tasks allocated to the worker may be numerous and difficult to specify in 
a contract or to monitor. If complete long term  contracts were feasible, the 
entrepreneur could obtain the first best level of effort e* maximizing / (e )  — e,
i.e. such tha t f ' (e*)  =  1, via an incentive contract signed in stage A. In 
contrast, signing a contract contingent on the effort or on the profit in stage
5The assumption that the outside opportunity wage is identical in both stages is without 
loss of generality.
6All our results concerning the wage flexibility also hold if it is defined as w b  — w a -
7In what follows, nothing changes when introducing uncertainty on the realization of the 
returns (ie: we could write E g  instead of g ) except when specified in section 4 .3  if the 
realization occurs between the effort being exerted and the stage B wage being contracted.
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A is assumed to be impossible or too costly. For a high level of effort to be 
chosen, the parties have to rely on self-enforcing contracts.
A ss u m p tio n  2 ; Long term  contracts are not feasible .
A justification of this assumption is th a t the return  to be realized is non ver­
ifiable in stage A, but it can be made verifiable at the beginning of stage B. For 
instance, for g ( e ) to be verifiable and wb  to be enforceable, the entrepreneur 
has to send a message (whose existence is observable but not verifiable) when 
the state  of nature at the beginning of stage B is revealed. This could be the 
disclosure of a trade contract or the result of a R&D stage. Thus, while it can­
not be explicitly agreed ex ante tha t this message will be sent, the entrepreneur 
must send it before signing the contract in stage B: otherwise, the entrepreneur 
would pretend th a t no return  has been generated. The worker would antic­
ipate tha t the wage contract is not enforceable and would not agree to sign 
it. No return  would be realized. An alternative explanation is th a t accounting 
m anipulations are possible in order to hide profits, but tha t they can occur 
only before the effort is made. In equilibrium, the profit will actually be made 
verifiable when bargaining in stage B.
A ssu m p tio n  3 : The stage B  wage bargaining game is as follows: a take- 
it-or-leave-it offer is made by the entrepreneur with probability p and by the 
worker with probability (1  — p). We call p  the en trepreneur’s bargaining power.
Several factors may affect bargaining powers. For instance, when there are 
several workers, the union’s bargaining power is likely to increase with the 
number of unionized workers: more representation brings more dues which can 
be spent on negotiating, looking for outside options, financing industrial ac­
tions,... It may also commit more workers to the actions decided by the union. 
In addition, bargaining powers can reflect characteristics of the production 
technology an d /o r the nature of the effort. For instance, the entrepreneur’s
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bargaining power is likely to be low when the worker hired in stage A is cru­
cial for the realization of the return and when his effort is an investment in 
human capital which other firms value. These factors themselves may depend 
on the entrepreneur’s skills and the production technology8. The bargaining 
power may also be affected by the concentration in ownership structure or the 
delegation of control: for instance, if the entrepreneur is the most im portant 
shareholder of the firm, she is more willing to spend in haggling when her share 
is large9.
Let K  be the entrepreneur’s initial capital. As we proceed, we shall compare 
the project described above with a similar project where the return  is a function 
of an investment I  from the entrepreneur. For simplicity, we shall often assume 
that I  is not contractible. For the sake of clarity, we shall focus on the case 
where the entrepreneur is capital constrained and where she cannot obtain 
enough money from outside investors to finance I.
We shall consider th a t there are two possible types of entrepreneurs: soft 
ones S with a bargaining power p s and tough raiders R with a bargaining power 
Pr  >  P s 10- An entrepreneur’s type is common knowledge and can be viewed 
as a reputation tha t the entrepreneurs cannot m anipulate11. The question 
is whether the soft or the tough entrepreneur is better off. The incumbent 
entrepreneur is S. R can take over the firm at cost D  after e was exerted and
8The entrepreneur’s monitoring and/or production technologies may make him more or 
less dependent on the initial worker. For instance, the entrepreneur may learn how to perform 
a number of productive and monitoring tasks. Since she will not be able to perform the tasks 
she did not learn, not to learn some tasks is a commitment to delegate. The worker will 
observe what tasks the entrepreneur can perform, what tasks will be delegated to him and 
thus how necessary he is likely to be.
9In this case, we shall see that as in Habib (1994) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi 
(1995), the entrepreneur may wish to be a small shareholder, here because this commits him  
not to spend much on haggling. However, we shall keep the bargaining power exogenous.
10 We shall see that if there were a continuum of raiders with bargaining powers in \ps , Pr \ ,  
then the toughest raider has the highest incentive to take over the firm.
11Akerlof (1983) argues that behaviour depends on education and values taught earlier 
and that it may be very costly to manipulate them. Similarly, one might think that people 
acquire and use some skills and that new skills affecting their bargaining power are difficult 
to acquire on the spot.
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before w b  is contracted12. The analysis is not affected under the alternative 
assumption th a t there is no takeover, but S cannot commit not to become R 
at cost D .
3 W age N eg o tia tio n s  and In vestm en t
In this section, we assume away takeovers, i.e. D  =  + 0 0 . Only the incumbent 
entrepreneur can realize p(e). We thus abstract from the subscript s.
3.1 W orker’s Effort and W age F lexib ility
We proceed by backward induction and first derive w b -  W ith probability p, 
the entrepreneur offers icg =  w 0 to the worker who does not benefit from his 
effort. W ith probability 1 — p, the worker offers w b  =  p(e) and appropriates
the whole surplus. Hence, in expected terms, (E ) w b  is given by:
w B =  w 0 +  ( 1  -  p )/(e ) (2 )
In equilibrium, the worker exerts:
e** =  arg max{u;o +  (1 -  p ) f ( e )  -  e}  (3)
which leads to:
= T ^ )  W
Since / "  <  0, / '  is a  mapping function and e(p)  and e'(p) are well defined.
If /(e**) -  e** -  w0 <C 0 , the worker s effort leads to a negative profit and the
project is not undertaken. We focus on the non trivial case where — e** >
wo. There is underprovision of effort with respect to the social optim um  as soon
as the entrepreneur’s bargaining power is strictly positive. W hen the worker
is hired, his individual rationality (IR) constraint is:
12How the surplus is shared between the raider and the incumbent entrepreneur does not 
affect the analysis.
wa +  w B{e**) >  2w 0 +  e** (5)
Since the initial labour m arket is perfectly competitive, this constraint is 
binding. Therefore, the initial wage is wa =  2id0 +  e** — w B <  w 0 +  e** (with 
equality only for e =  0). The worker expects to enjoy rents in stage B and is 
ready to work at a low wage in stage A.
In addition, the competitive initial labour m arket enables the entrepreneur 
to appropriate all the rents ex ante so tha t her payoff coincides with the social 
surplus. It is an increasing function of the effort up to the first best effort level 
and we obtain the following result13:
P ro p o s it io n  1 ; The w orker’s effort, the wage flexibility and the en trepreneur’s 
payoff  all increase with the w orker’s bargaining power.
P ro o f: See Appendix. □
e** and wa are constrained by the entrepreneur’s inability to commit to a 
high w B . For instance, if the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power, she 
cannot commit in stage A to w B greater than w 0. Thus, the worker does not 
accept a wage wa lower than w 0 and has no incentive to exert an effort. In 
contrast, the first best obtains for p =  0  as the worker is residual claimant. 
A low bargaining power enables the entrepreneur to commit to a high w B . 
A higher bargaining power increases the worker’s marginal revenue and hence 
his provision of effort and his wage flexibility14. Since the entrepreneur needs 
K  >  wa to undertake the project, a direct consequence of Proposition 1 follows:
13A recent literature studies possible contractual solutions to hold up problems. MacLeod 
and Malcomson (1993) assume rich enough verifiable partition of the set of the states of 
nature, while Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) assume that a default trade option is 
contractible. We ruled out these assumptions in the present model.
14Similarly, for a given p , the effort and wage flexibility increase with the marginal return 
on effort g ' . This suggests that the degree of competition in the product market should affect 
the impact of union power on the worker’s effort. For instance, if competition decreases the 
marginal return on effort, union power matters more when competition decreases.
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C o ro lla ry  1 : The initial capital K  necessary to finance the project is de­
creasing in the w orker’s bargaining power.
Wage flexibility has many other advantages. For instance, it may help avoid 
bankruptcy. Assume K  <  wa +  i, where i is the cost of buying equipment 
necessary to realize the project. The liquidation value of the equipment is i at 
the end of stage A and 0 in stage B. Suppose tha t a return g0 >  w 0 +  i — K  is 
realized in stage A with probability 1 —  e. W ith probability e, there is no return 
in stage A. Assume tha t the stage A wage contract cannot be made contingent 
on whether g0 is generated or not. If no return is realized in stage A, the worker 
must accept a wage K  — i to avoid bankruptcy while he would obtain K  if 
bankruptcy occured (leading to g(e)  =  0). He does so w b ~ w 0  =  (1 —p ) f ( e )  > i .  
B ankruptcy will occur with probability e unless the worker’s bargaining power 
is large enough.
How are these results affected when the initial labour m arket is imperfect? 
In this case, the entrepreneur cannot appropriate the whole surplus ex ante 
and an increase in p  may hurt her and not be Pareto-improving. For instance, 
if the worker must be hired at w 0 <  K ,  the effort and the social surplus are still 
decreasing in p, but 7r is non monotonic in p  (see Appendix)15. W hen K  <  w 0, 
the worker must agree on a wage concession for the project to be undertaken. 
He will only do so if wb  — wo >  u>o +  w a , tha t is if his bargaining power is 
high enough. But if a less profitable project can be financed with K  only or if 
there is a risk of bankruptcy, it may not be in the interest of the entrepreneur 
to have a bargaining power which is low enough to obtain a wage concession 
or to avoid the risk of bankruptcy, although it is socially desirable. Indeed, the 
main conceptual changes are tha t when the labour m arket is imperfect, the 
entrepreneur may not be better off having a low bargaining power and tha t 
she must be financially constrained to obtain a wage concession16.
15We could alternatively assume that the worker has some bargaining power in stage A.
16For a discussion of how she can use this strategically, see Perotti and Spier (1993).
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3.2 T he C osts and B enefits o f U nion Power
W hen the worker’s bargaining power increases, a higher worker’s effort and 
wage flexibility may come at the expense of the entrepreneur’s incentive to 
invest. Assume that g  is a function of I.  Ex ante, the entrepreneur appropriates 
all the surplus, so tha t ex ante her incentive to invest the first best I* is not 
affected by p.  However, after hiring the worker, the entrepreneur’s incentive 
to invest increases with p.  But her actual investment must satisfy the budget 
constraint I  <  K  — 104 =  K  — w0 +  (1  — p ) f ( I )  who becomes tighter when p  
increases. W hen she cannot commit to invest at the beginning of the game, 
she chooses I  so as to maximize p f ( I ) — I  under the constraint I  <  K  — w 0 +  
( 1  — p ) f ( I ) ,  which implies /  =  m in { /'- 1 ( l/p ) , K  — w 0 +  (1 —p ) f ( I ) } .  We thus 
have costs and benefits of union power:
C o ro lla ry  2  ; The higher the w orker’s bargaining power, the higher the en­
trepreneur’s capacity to undertake an investment, but the lower her incentive  
to invest when choosing I .
W hen the worker is hired at Wo and the entrepreneur can finance I  =  
K  — wo < / ' - 1 ( l /p ) , the worker makes a wage concession to finance a further 
investment A I  up to A I  £ argm ax2ic0 — A I  +  (1 — p ) f ( I  +  A /) , tha t is 
up to ( 1  — p ) f ' ( I  +  A I)  =  1 . Thus, the wage concession increases with the 
worker’s bargaining power. Nevertheless, the entrepreneur’s incentive to invest 
may become so low when p  decreases tha t the restriction in I  may outweigh 
the increase in the share of the pie for the worker. In this case, the worker 
anticipates tha t a wage concession will not be fully used to invest and wage 
flexibility may actually decrease with his bargaining power.
Even when there is no need for wage flexibility, costs and benefits of the 
worker’s bargaining power may come from the worker’s effort and the en­
trepreneur’s investment. Assume tha t the worker must be hired at w 0 and that 
the return  g increases both with e and / .  Suppose tha t / ( e ,  I)  =  g ( e , I)  — w 0
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satisfies f e > 0 , f i >  0 , / e(0 , / )  > 1, / j( e , 0 ) >  1, f e,e <  0 , f i j  <  0 , f e,i >  0 . 
This is a double moral hazard problem. The social optimum (e*, /*) would 
maximize / ( e ,  I) — e — I  and would satisfy / e(e*, /*) =  /j(e* , /*) =  1, assuming 
tha t an interior solution exists. Obtaining it would require to break the budget 
constraint and to give the full returns of her investment to each party. How­
ever, the worker and the entrepreneur maximize respectively ( 1  — p )/(e , I) — e 
and p /(e ,7 )  — 7, so tha t the investment levels must satisfy (1 — p ) /e(e,7) =  
p //(e ,7 )  =  1 . Both parties underinvest. An optimal bargaining power max­
imizes m a x /(e ,7 )  — e — I  s.t. (1 — p ) /e(e,7) =  p //(e ,7 )  =  1. A general 
solution of this programme cannot obtain without strong additional assump­
tions on f  } 7 The most simple intuition can be captured with g ( e , 7) =  
A in 7'ye1 - 7  , V(e,7) E E i2+ (with A  large and 7  E [0,1] — {0.5}). The in­
centive constraints give 7 =  Ap'y and e =  A(1 — p)(l — 7 ) and the unique 
optimal bargaining power equals ( 7  — — 1). In this specific
example, an increase in p  increases 7 and decreases e. In this specific exam­
ple, one p arty ’s marginal revenue is not affected by the other p a rty ’s action. 
Nevertheless, for other functions, a decrease in a party ’s bargaining power may 
well increase her marginal reward of action via an increase in the other p a rty ’s 
action.
One p arty ’s bargaining power may be either too high or too low from the 
social surplus viewpoint, leading to inefficient investment levels. The next 
section studies how the possibility of takeovers may affect our analysis. We 
shall see th a t the worker’s effort and wage flexibility may well decrease with 
his initial bargaining power.
1 in tu itively , when the intersection of the curves corresponding to the constraints is empty,
there is no equilibrium solution. When this intersection is a discrete set, a solution is obtained 
by comparing the maximand in all these points. When the intersection is a more general 
closed set, we can study the maximization problem in this set under the unique remaining 
constraint.
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4 Takeovers and Im p licit C on tracts
In this section, we analyze the impact of a takeover threat on the worker’s 
effort and wage flexibility. We set D  <  + 0 0 . We first go back to the basic 
model where the return  only depends on the effort from the worker. From now 
on, we shall consider the variables as functions of the entrepreneur’s bargaining 
power: e(p) =  e**(p), f \ p ]  =  f  o e(p),  w A\p], w b [p ]- Choosing a level of effort 
and agreeing on w A possibly lower than Wq constitutes an implicit contract 
{ e , w A(e)}.  The set of implicit contracts (i.e. { e , w A(e) }  satisfying (2), (3) 
and (5)) depends on bargaining in stage B and the takeover threat.
4.1 Takeover Threat and Efficiency:
In this subsection, we show th a t potential takeovers prevent the entrepreneur 
from committing to some implicit contracts. A takeover th reat can induce 
the worker to underinvest and lower the social surplus and the entrepreneur’s 
profit. Furthermore, we show that the worker’s effort and wage flexibility may 
decrease with his initial bargaining power. We first assume th a t the same 
return g(e)  can be realized under either S or R (the entrepreneurs differ in 
their bargaining power only)18.
P ro p o s it io n  2  : When D  >  (p r — p s ) f [ p s ] ,  there is no takeover threat. The 
threat of a takeover restricts the set o f  implicit contracts and reduces the social 
surplus. There exists e <  e(pr ) such that:
1. I f  (pr — p s) f { £)  <  D  <  [ Pr  ~  P s ) f [ P s \ >  then the worker exerts the effort 
satisfying (pr —p s) f ( e ) =  D  and there is no takeover. The w o rk er ’s effort, 
the wage flexibility and the social surplus increase with p s .
2. I f  D  <  (p r — p s) f ( §) ,  then the effort is e(pr ) and the takeover takes place.
18If raiders with a continuum of bargaining powers could take over the firm before the 
worker is hired, the takeover would be led by the raider maximizing the value of the firm. It 
would be desirable if and only if the social surplus under the raider’s bargaining power was 
higher than that under the incumbent entrepreneur.
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P ro o f: See Appendix. D
The set of implicit contracts is restricted by the mere th reat of a takeover. 
The only incentive to take over the firm for R is to breach implicit contracts. 
W hen the effort is high, the return and the incentive to breach implicit con­
tracts are high. The worker may thus exert an effort low enough to prevent 
the takeover, i.e. e such th a t D  =  (p r — p*)/(e). In addition, an increase in the 
incumbent entrepreneur’s bargaining power reduces the incentive for a raider 
to take over the firm to earn from a lower w g.  Thus, the worker can exert a 
higher effort which still prevents the takeover.
The worker is not always better off reducing his effort to prevent the 
takeover. W hen this strategic effort reduces the pie too much, he is better 
off enlarging the pie, i.e. exerting e(pr), and negotiating with R. However, he 
may be ready to reduce the pie below that under R to keep a larger share: we 
may observe a lower effort under the threat of a takeover by R than  e(pr ). A 
natural question is then how the restriction result is affected when the worker 
can make a wage concession in stage B to prevent the takeover and when he 
will be better off making this wage concession.
C o ro lla ry  3 ; When possible, the worker makes a wage concession in stage  
B conditional upon S  keeping control when D  < (p r — p s ) f [ P r ] -  The effort is 
e(pr ).
P ro o f: See Appendix. □
W hen the takeover does not take place, the incumbent entrepreneur and the 
worker save D  (or part of it if the raider has some bargaining power). The wage 
concession b >  0 must satisfy b >  (pr — p s) f ( e )  — D.  This entrepreneur’s IC 
constraint is binding. W hen making a wage concession, the worker must give 
away the whole surplus he would get under S compared to R net of the takeover 
cost. Ex ante, his effort satisfies maxe(l — p r) f ( e )  — e — D  A wage concession
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leads him  to exert e ( p T) .  His IC constraint, which is (1 — p s ) f [ P r ]  — b > 
(1 - p r ) f \ P r ]  when D  <  (p r - p s ) f ( e ) and (1 -  p s ) f \ p r } - b > ( l  -  p s ) f ( e ) when 
(Pr  -  P s ) f ( e )  <  D  <  ( p r -  P a ) f \ p r ],  is satisfied when D  <  ( p r — p s ) f [ P r ] ,  so 
tha t he is be tter off exerting e ( p r ) and conceding b >  (p r — p s ) f ( e )  — D .  In 
contrast, when D  >  (p r — p s ) f \ p T\ ,  a wage concession leads the worker to exert 
an effort which is lower than without wage concession and the pie is smaller. 
He is b e tte r off not making the wage concession and preventing the takeover 
only by a restriction in his effort19.
Proposition 2 also establishes tha t the takeover threat reduces the wage 
flexibility (and thus the capital necessary to undertake the project) which, 
however, increases with p s. Hence, when g is a function of / ,  the possibility 
of a takeover may be either desirable or not: when the entrepreneur is not 
financially constrained, a takeover increases S’s marginal reward of investment 
and is desirable. If p  is high enough to allow the takeover, the worker cannot 
prevent it. W hen the entrepreneur is financially constrained, we obtain:
C o ro lla ry  4 : Suppose that g is a function o f  I . A takeover increases the 
entrepreneur’s incentive to invest, but its mere possibility tightens her budget 
constraint.
W hen /  is financially constrained and the initial labour m arket is perfect, 
the budget constraint I  <  K  — w 0 +  (1 — p ) f ( I )  is tighter when the takeover 
is expected. W hen the initial labour market is imperfect, the worker’s decision 
to agree on a wage concession is affected by the takeover threat: he may be 
better off either making the wage concession to finance an investment allowing 
the takeover or strategically limit his wage concession to make sure tha t the
19Similarly, if the incumbent entrepreneur were R and this implied a cost higher than the 
takeover cost, the worker would sometimes be better off promising a wage concession to S 
to induce him to take over the firm. This is what happened at TWA and Eastern Airlines. 
Such a wage concession may not take place when the takeover cost is too high, the workers 
face a wealth constraint (and credit rationing) or a coordination failure (so that a subsequent 
free rider problem among the workers cannot be overcome) or the workers want to build a 
reputation for refusing wage concessions.
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actual investment will not entail a takeover. In this la tte r case, the possibility 
of a takeover may only decrease the investment20.
4.2 Takeover D efence M echanism s and V eto Power
W hen the worker’s effort and wage flexibility are valuable, it may be desirable 
to make sure tha t there is no threat of breach of implicit contracts. In this 
section, we focus on two mechanisms which may be used to achieve this goal: 
takeovers defence mechanisms increasing the takeover cost and a worker’s veto 
power on the takeover. Here, defence mechanisms may be either autom atic 
(e.g. increases in capital) or at the discretion of the entrepreneur, but only 
an autom atic increase in D  can help because S could not commit to prevent a 
takeover beneficial to him if he had discretion over the takeover cost.
W hen the possibility of a takeover is inefficient, it is easy to see tha t in 
our setup a takeover defence mechanism, i.e. D  high enough to prevent any 
takeover, and a worker’s veto power are equivalent: they prevent the takeover. 
Since the takeover is purely redistributive, both systems make sure th a t there 
is no breach of implicit contracts and there is no takeover. Both systems lead to 
higher levels of effort and wage flexibility, more surplus and a higher S’s payoff 
when the initial labour market is perfect. W ith an imperfect labour market, S 
may obtain more by favouring a takeover than by setting up takeover defence 
mechanisms. W hen takeovers are desirable, i.e. when I  is crucial and the 
worker’s effort and the wage flexibility are not, there should be a very low D  
and no veto power.
We now turn  to the case where the takeover is not purely redistributive. 
Up to now, we have assumed tha t S and R had the same valuation of the firm. 
Assume instead tha t the tough raider’s valuation in stage A is a / ,  where a  is 
an observable, but not verifiable random variable which is realized at the end
20In our setup, when g is a function of e and / ,  there is no Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies under a takeover threat given the discontinuity in the payoffs. When an error 
term is introduced, there may be either complementarity or substitutability between e and 
/ .
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of stage A, i.e. R ’s valuation differs’ from S’s and is not known in advance. 
For simplicity, a  is uniformly distributed on [a, a] with 0 <  a  <  1 <  a .  We 
say th a t a takeover is (ex post) value increasing (resp. value decreasing) when 
the realization a  of a  is greater (resp. lower) than 1 .
The raider takes over when a p rf ( e )  — D  >  p sf ( e ) ,  th a t is:
 ^ P sf(e )  +  D  
a  >  ------ — —  (b)
P r f { e )
After a takeover, w b  =  Wo +  a ( l  — pr )/(e )  instead of w 0 +  (1 — ps)/(e ) . If 
a  >  (the RHS is always strictly higher than 1 ), w b  is higher than under S 
and the worker profits from the takeover. Otherwise, w b  is lower than absent 
the takeover. Thus, a takeover must be subsequently value increasing not to 
lead to a lower w b • In addition, the gains from breaching implicit contracts 
need not be dominated by the loss in the value of the firm: a value decreasing 
takeover can occur when the RHS of (6 ) is lower than 1 .
L e m m a  1  ; When the effort is sunk, a value increasing takeover m ay  either  
increase or reduce w b - Value decreasing takeovers can occur in order to breach 
implicit contracts.
We now address the case where entrepreneurs also differ in their ability to 
run the firm. W hen it is known in advance who will run the firm, an anti­
takeover mechanism can prevent the inefficiency due to takeovers because the 
cost does not need to be contingent on the raider. When a  < 1 , introducing 
a takeover cost D  at least equal to the gain from breaching implicit contracts, 
tha t is D  >  vdb\Ps] — ^ s [p r] =  (pr — Ps)o tf{e), prevents the takeover and 
the worker exerts e(ps ). W hen a  >  1 , introducing D  — (pr — p s) a f ( e )  to 
be given to the worker is optimal since a value increasing takeover does not 
breach implicit contracts and does not restrict them. If a  is a non degenerated 
random variable, the characteristics of the future entrepreneur are unknown. 
We obtain:
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P ro p o s it io n  3 : (1) An automatic takeover cost cannot allow all value in­
creasing takeovers and protect all implicit contracts. (2) A w orker’s veto right 
on the sale o f  the firm  protects all implicit contracts and allows all socially  
desirable takeovers.
P ro o f: See Appendix □
The intuition is simple: when D  is low enough to allow all possible value 
increasing takeovers, some of them  can breach implicit contracts. On the other 
hand, when D  is high enough to protect the implicit contracts, a value in­
creasing takeover may be prevented. R could buy the firm, pay D  and breach 
implicit contracts for some realizations of a  and could be prevented from buy­
ing the firm for others. D  should depend on R ’s valuation, which is impossible 
since a  is not contractible. Thus, a takeover cost D  induces inefficiencies21. In 
contrast, the veto right enables the worker to react ex post and case by case. 
There is no breach of implicit contracts and the takeovers which take place are 
exactly the socially desirable ones22.
The proposition above, however, may become an argument against the 
worker’s veto right when the firm invests and the worker’s bargaining power 
is too high. The veto right may enable the worker to keep an excessive bar­
gaining power and imply inefficient levels of investments, fn the absence of a 
veto power, a takeover reducing the worker’s bargaining power increases S’s 
incentive to invest and may be desirable. A social planner or an entrepreneur 
is led to opt for no defence, a usual anti-takeover mechanism or a worker’s veto 
power depending on the environment, tha t is the industry (the shape of the 
profit function /(• , •)), the entrepreneur’s capital and the population of raiders.
21 Moreover, a risk-averse party may want to insure against risk and increase these takeover 
costs to accept implicit contracts.
22W ith a competitive labour market, the worker cannot use his veto power to get a rent. 
But when S does not have all the bargaining power with R, the worker’s veto power may 
enable her to extract ex ante a share of R ’s surplus: The worker anticipates that he can 
use his veto power when bargaining with R for some values of a  and he can be hired at a 
low w a • When the initial labour market is imperfect, the worker can use his veto power to 
obtain a part of the surplus, depending on his bargaining game with R.
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4.3 Infinite Horizon
This section studies how the analysis above is affected when the project is in­
finitely repeated. It is shown tha t 1) the worker’s effort in each period does not 
necessarily decrease with the entrepreneur’s bargaining power in the absence 
of takeovers and 2 ) tha t the repetition helps enforce implicit contracts.
The two-stage game above is infinitely repeated. Stages A and B occur 
in each period 1, 2, ... The entrepreneur or the raider maximizes the sum of 
the net present value of the firm and of the earnings from a possible breach 
in implicit contracts (zero for the incumbent). He can thus be considered as a 
long run player and we assume that he is infinitely long-lived. In contrast, each 
generation of employees works one period. The worker only maximizes his wage 
within each period. If he cannot observe the past, he only plays the stage game 
as studied above. Instead, we assume that the worker is unionized and that 
the long-lived union coordinates the workers’ strategies over generations. The 
union enables the workers to behave as long run players, for instance because it 
has enough resources to observe the past and build a reputation23. We assume 
that p  is constant over time.
The entrepreneur would like to commit to the cooperative wage w B =  g(e)  
to induce the socially optimal effort e*. However, in each period, he can only 
commit to w Bc =  w0 -f ( 1  — p ) f ( e ) .
We exhibit one particular equilibrium in order to show th a t the intuition 
may differ from tha t of the stage game. We assume that the strategy of the 
union is a trigger strategy: to exert a cooperative effort ec >  enc as long as the 
entrepreneur’s offer in the stage B wage bargaining game is g(e°) so tha t each 
worker obtains w cB =  g (ec) and wa binding (5); and to reject the agreement 
and to exert only enc during T  periods as soon as the entrepreneur makes an 
offer strictly lower than g{e°). Effort, return and worker’s stage B wage are now 
considered as functions of p, 8 and T, where 8 is the discount factor common
23For a theory of collective reputation, see Tirole (1996).
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to all agents.
D e fin itio n  1  ; The intrinsic net present value V \p ,8 ,T ]  o f  the f irm  (or IN P V )  
is the sum  o f  its profits i f  it is run by an entrepreneur with the sam e bargaining 
pow er all the time:
OO
V[p, 6,T] = 22 Sr~‘ [sip, 8, T ] - w a -  w b (?)
T  —  t
The workers exert ec such tha t breaching does not pay, i.e. such tha t the 
gain from breaching is lower than the loss on the value of the firm.
g (ec) -  w Q -  (1 -  p ) f ( e c) <
<5(1 -  *?) [ f ( e c) ~ e c ~  [/(e"c(p)) -  e"‘(p)]]
1 - 8 (8)
This entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint can be rewritten:
p( 1 -  S)
/ ( e c) -  ec >  f { e nc(p))  -  enc(p) (9)S ( l - S T)_
For the condition to be satisfied, | l  — ] rnust be large enough, and
in particular positive. Given that 
realized when S and T  are high enough
increases with 6, T, ec is only
P ro p o s it io n  4 ; The w orker’s effort and I N P V  of the f irm  increase with 6 ,T  
and (1) they increase with the union’s bargaining power when 6 a n d /o r  T  are 
low enough, (2) they either increase or decrease with p when 6 and T  are 
moderately high, (3) the first best is attained fo r  any p not too close to 1 when 
8 and T  are high enough.
P ro o f: See Appendix.
There are two conflicting effects. On the one hand, raising the union’s 
bargaining power increases w ’ff  and thus reduces the gain from breaching im­
plicit contracts. This eases the sustainability of implicit contracts and hence
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increases the value of the firm. On the other hand, when the union’s bargaining 
power decreases, the non cooperative INPV decreases (since everything is as 
in the stage game), and so the loss on the value of the firm in case of breach 
increases when 6 and T  are high enough to make cooperation sustainable.
The assumption tha t p  is constant over time is not crucial for the INPV 
discipline effect. Consider tha t the entrepreneur can m anipulate the union 
power and th a t the initial labour market is imperfect. In case of breach, the 
union will go back to the non cooperative investment. It anticipates tha t the 
entrepreneur will choose his power p m in order to maximize his profit. W hen 
investing ex ante, the workers know that the loss on the value of the firm in 
case of breach will be V c — V nc\pm]. Such a loss would depend on the initial 
entrepreneur’s bargaining power as long as there is a rigidity in the union’s 
bargaining power.
W hen the horizon is infinite, an optimal union’s bargaining power may be 
strictly lower than 1 even when only the worker’s investment m atters. The 
INPV discipline enables the entrepreneur to obtain a higher investment than 
the one obtained in the stage game for a given bargaining power. This is im ­
portant when the entrepreneur must invest. If the union’s strategy is credible, 
the entrepreneur can commit not only to give the wages necessary to obtain a 
high level of investment, but also to undertake a high investment.
Furthermore, when /  is not constant, but increasing over tim e (for all £, 
f t+ i  >  /*), or may increase with the levels of effort exerted in the preceeding 
stages, the set of implicit contracts is enlarged, which in turn  increases the 
profits. In contrast, when /  decreases over time,i.e. in declining industries, the 
set of feasible implicit contracts is restricted, which reduces the profits. There 
is an accelerating (and self-fulfilling under uncertainty) effect.
The results above are less clear-cut under some cases of uncertainty. In the 
stage game, when the return to be realized is unknown in stage A, the results 
above do not change if the return is revealed after the stage B wage contract
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has been signed. However, it is shown in Appendix th a t if the return is revealed 
after the effort has been exerted and before the stage B wage contract is signed, 
the set of feasible implicit contracts may be restricted. Profits higher than 
expected, i.e. booms, would enable the entrepreneur to gain from breaching 
implicit contracts if the constraint (9) is binding. Anticipating this, the workers 
face a more demanding constraint. The effect of the union’s static bargaining 
power on her investment also depends on uncertainty.
P ro p o s it io n  5 ; The threat o f  a takeover led either by a soft or a tough raider  
in order to breach implicit contracts m ay reduce the w orkers ’ investm ent. I f  
the overall takeover cost is too low to prevent the takeover, then the investm ent  
is non cooperative and the toughest raider takes over the firm .
S k e tch  o f P ro o f: See Appendix.
The existence and the importance of this restriction depends on the popu­
lation of raiders, on the discount factor and on the horizon of the union. If 6 
and T  are so high tha t no potential raider has interest to breach (5), then there 
is no restriction. In this case, the prospects of the firm help sustain implicit 
contracts. If S and T  are too low to avoid restriction, then other enforcement 
mechanisms may help. Considering tha t raiders may have different valuations 
and proceeding, the same discussion about takeover defence mechanisms ap­
plies when these mechanisms are necessary. Since the workers’ investment 
increases with 8, T, anti-takeover mechanisms can be seen as a remedy against 
the financial market myopia and the union’s inability to sustain long term  
strategies. In contrast, their existence is not justified when this remedy is not 
necessary to enter (efficient) implicit contracts.
Furthermore, when the INPV is large due to a high cooperative investment, 
there are no takeovers initiated to lead the firm to bankruptcy. A bad raider 
would have to pay a high price and the loss on the value of the firm in case 
of breach would be im portant. This suggests th a t financial m anipulations and
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takeovers with breach of trust rarely take place in organizations where the 
union has the ability to retaliate in case of breach.
5 C on clu d in g  R em arks
This chapter studied a two-stage game where the entrepreneur’s incentive to 
invest versus the workers’ effort and wage flexibility are costs and benefits of 
union power in wage negotiations. The threat of a takeover leading to a reduc­
tion in the future bargained wage lowers the workers’ effort and wage flexibility 
and hence may also lower the social surplus and the firm’s payoff. Under such 
a threat, the workers’ effort and wage flexibility decrease with the initial union 
power. In the repeated game, the workers’ effort is not necessarily monotonic 
in the union’s bargaining power. There is a tradeoff between the earnings of 
breaching implicit contracts and the loss on the value of the firm. Hence, the 
future is a discipline and increasing the discount factor and the workers’ abil­
ity to retaliate in case of breach may be desirable. This control mechanism is 
likely to help enforce efficient implicit contracts since they increase the value 
of the firm while inefficient ones lower it. W hen this discipline cannot help, 
anti-takeover mechanisms or workers’ veto power may be used, but they create 
inefficiencies.
W hile this work focused on takeovers, the main points remain valid for other 
cases such as the effect of financial manipulations on wage negotiations (Perotti 
and Spier (1993) and Sarig (1992)) and supplier/buyer relationships (Chemla 
(1996)). Potential financial manipulations may restrict wage flexibility and 
implicit contracts. Manipulations maximizing the shareholders’ payoff ex post 
may lower the social surplus and the actual shareholders’ payoff. To commit not 
to m anipulate a financial structure may be difficult as the financial structure 
has many other effects on signalling, agency relationships, corporate control 
contests and the industrial markets (see Harris and Raviv (1992)). However, 
to make renegotiation costly through an optimal debt structure (Bolton and
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Scharfstein (1996)), to encourage the formation of unions or to give the workers 
or trading partners a veto right on some manipulations may sometimes be 
desirable24.
In addition, an agency problem between shareholders and a m anager could 
lead to other kinds of inefficient implicit contracts than  those considered here. 
For instance, implicit contracts can be agreed on between any two parties 
within shareholders, entrepreneur and workers. Hence, a takeover may be 
such th a t the implicit contracts between the shareholders and the entrepreneur 
(resp. the workers) are not breached, but tha t those involving the workers 
(resp. the entrepreneur) are breached. The raider can induce the entrepreneur 
to breach implicit contracts and compensate him for the loss he incurs by 
breaching, such as a loss in reputation. Thus, a friendly takeover as defined 
in Shleifer and Summers could breach implicit contracts. However, takeovers 
also have a disciplinary role against inefficient implicit contracts th a t takeover 
defence mechanisms or a union’s veto power may help sustain. The tradeoff 
between these opposite effects should be considered when debating the role of 
unions and agreeing on takeover defence mechanisms.
The one principal - one agent approach considered here should be considered 
as an intermediary step towards a better understanding of unions. A highly 
stylized extension of our model is to consider tha t independent employees ex­
ert an effort equal to 0 or 1 . Hence, a higher effort may lead to a higher level 
of employment (assuming tha t other considerations such as moral hazard in 
teams do not offset this effect). There is a tradeoff between this positive effect 
on the economic activity and on employment and the effects of a higher labour 
cost. In addition, one would expect tha t when the effect of union power on 
wage flexibility is negatively correlated with its effect on unemployment fluc­
24In Perotti and Spier, financial manipulations led in order to force the workers to renego­
tiate their wage make risk-averse workers bear some risk, which is inefficient. The workers’ 
veto right would be Pareto-improving since it would make the risk-neutral party bear the 
risk by preventing the strategic use of financial manipulations.
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tuations. However, the setup in the present chapter may well be too simple. A 
challenge to a more satisfactory theory of unions is to endogeneize the number 
of workers and to study problems of coordination, monitoring, collusion and 
the constitution of unions which are likely to play a key role in practice.
Finally, this work emphasized the importance of understanding where a 
bargaining power comes from and the extent in which it can be endogeneized 
in long run industrial relations and in corporate finance. The union power 
should depend on the corporate and financial structure, the discount factor, 
the population of raiders, uncertainty, the industry (according to its prospects, 
to the im portance of implicit contracts, to the possibility to hide profits and to 
the pie to bargain on), the set of credible strategies and the organizational form 
of the firm. This should be taken into account in studying how the charter of 
the firm or side contracts may affect bargaining outcomes.
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APPENDIX
P r o o f  o f P ro p o s it io n  1 : We only have to prove th a t increases with p  
and th a t it is lower than w 0.
v y  >  p, V e £  m + ,  ( 1  -  p' ) f ( e )  -  e <  ( 1  -  p ) f ( e )  -  e (10)
This implies that:
Vp7 >  Pi m ax(l — p' ) f ( e )  — e <  m ax(l — p ) f ( e )  — e (1 1 )
i.e. wa\ p ') >  w a [p \- Last, the worker exerts the effort e if and only if 
e <  ( 1  — p ) f ( e ) .  Therefore, <  w 0.
However, 7r is not monotonic in p  when the worker must be hired at wage 
wq. In this case, the total wage is 2wq-\-{\ —p ) f ( e )  so tha t his IR constraint (5) 
is slack. The worker still maximizes (3) and e** still decreases with p, while 
the entrepreneur’s payoff is now:
7r(e) =  [J -  y ^ y ] / ( e" ) - 2t"o (12)
The derivative is:
\ f .  /‘"be**)
T'(e) = /'(e**) + [JJ ^ y 1 ~  2 (13)
W hen p  =  0, the effort is e*, so tha t tt' =  [ f  • — 1 <  0, while when
p =  1, the effort is zero and 7r'(0) >  0 (because f '(0 ) =  +oo). □
P r o o f  o f P ro p o s it io n  2  : R takes over if and only if p rf ( e ) — D  >  p s/(e ) , 
tha t is:
D  <  (pr - p s ) f { e )  (14)
The RHS of (14) increases with e. W hen D  is so high th a t (14) is not
satisfied for e =  e(ps), R never bids and the worker chooses e =  e(ps) (which
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decreases with p s). W hen D  £ (pr — Ps)f\pr]i  {pr — Ps)/[Pa])» the worker
can deter the takeover by exerting a level of effort e £ [e(pr ), e(ps)] such that 
D  =  (pr — p 3) f ( e ) .  Knowing this, he will choose an effort satisfying:
m ax{ max ( 1  -  p s) f { e )  -  e, max ( 1  - p r ) f ( e )  -  e} (15)
Given that:
max ( 1  — pr ) f ( e )  — e <  max ( 1  — »r )/Ye) — e
e€ [e ,e (p .,)]V ^  ^  W  “  e<E[0,e(p,)]V
=  ( 1  “ P r ) / b r ]  “  e ( P r )
<  (1 ~ P s ) f \ P r ]  ~  e ( p r ) (16)
The worker anticipates th a t he always loses from the takeover and he exerts 
e in order to prevent it. He expects w B =  (1 — ps) f ( e )  and obtains his stage
A wage is ^ ( e ) .  W hen p s varies and pr and D  are given, e =  / - 1 D
. P r - P s
increases with ps until e =  e(ps) and then the effort decreases with p s . The 
wages satisfy:
w B =  W q +  D -  —  (17)
P r  ~ P s
w A =
w a =  ^ 0  +  /  1 [— —— ] -  D - — —  (18)
l P r - P s ] P r - P s
D  r 1
( P r  ~ P s )  l f ' ° f  ' [ D / { P r - P s ) }
( 1  ~ P r )
D 1 1
{ Pr  - P s ) 2 L / ' ( e )  f { P r )  < 0  ^
wa  decreases and w B increases with p s. The entrepreneur’s bargaining 
power p t which maximizes the worker’s effort satisfies (p r — P t ) f \ p t ]  — D  (pt £ 
\ P r , P s ] ) -
When D  is so low that (14) is satisfied for e =  e(pr ), the worker can either 
choose a low effort e <  e(pr ) satisfying D  =  (pr — p s) f ( e )  (the existence of e 
is ensured by continuity) so as to prevent the takeover and bargain w B with S
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or choose e{jpr ) knowing tha t R will take over the firm. He will choose e if and 
only if:
(1 -  P a ) f { e )  =  (1 -  P s )   ---------  >  (1 -  P r ) f \ P r \  (20)
P r  P s
It is worthwile to choose a low effort to prevent the takeover when D  is 
slightly lower than (pr — p s) f \ p r\ • W hen D  or p s are very low, however, the 
worker chooses e[pr] (which does not vary with p s) and R takes over the firm. 
In addition, it is clear tha t e increases with p s . □
P r o o f  o f C o ro lla ry  3 : Allow the worker to make a wage concession b 
conditional upon the incumbent entrepreneur keeping control. Assume w ithout 
loss of generality th a t the incumbent entrepreneur gets the entire surplus in case 
of takeover. In stage B, the worker’s wage concession to induce the entrepreneur 
to keep control satisfies:
m axe)6 ( 1  - p a) f ( e ) - b  (2 1 )
s .t.  b >  (pr -  p s) f ( e )  — D  (22)
b < ( p r -  P s ) f ( e )  (23)
6 >  0 (24)
The entrepreneur’s IC constraint (2 2 ) is clearly binding, while the worker’s 
IC constraint (23) is slack. Ex ante, the worker’s effort is thus a solution of
maxe(l — P r ) f ( e )  — e which leads to e(pr ) and b =  (pr — p s ) f \ p r ]  ~  D  when
D ^  (,Pr — Ps)f\pr\  ^ and b — 0 otherwise. d
P r o o f  o f P ro p o s it io n  4 :
( 1 ) Call a i  and a 2 > Oi two possible realizations of A in ( 1 , ^5 ^ ) an<^  note 
Di =  (pr ~  Ps)&if(e)  with * C {1,2}. If the firm sets D  >  _D1? then a value 
increasing takeover is deterred when o i is realized. If D  <  D 2 , then the hold
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up problem arises when c*2 is realized. Since D \  is lower than  D 2 , no D  can 
protect implicit contract and allow value-increasing takeovers.
(2) If the worker has a veto right on the sale of the firm (and D  is exoge­
nous), he refuses any sale reducing his compensation ex post. If a ( l  — p r ) >  
( 1  — Pa), be benefits from a takeover and will accept it. Otherwise, he ac­
cepts the takeover if and only if he gets a complementary transfer N  such tha t 
N  +  a ( l  — p r) f { e )  >  (1 — Ps)f (e) -  The takeover takes place if and only if 
(a p r -  p s) f ( e )  — N  >  D.  □
P r o o f  o f P ro p o s it io n  4 : Note r 6,T =  an<^  ks,T(p) =  1 — r 6,Tp.
Given that k6,T(p) increases with T  and 8 ( s(i-s^) =  E i'(^ * )]-1 )j se  ^
cooperative efforts verifying (9) becomes larger when T  and 8 increase. So, 
e° increases with T  and 8 (when (9) is not satisfied, ec =  enc and, as the non 
cooperative INPV Vnc, is independent of 8 and T).
Discuss now how ec varies with p. Consider the curves G nc : enc — »■ 
p f ( e nc) — enc, G° : ec — > k6,T( p ) f  (ec) — ec and J  : e — >• / (e )  — e. In each 
point G nc and G c are below J . Moreover, cooperation only occurs when G c is 
above Gnc, that is when, 1 — r 6,Tp >  p or:
(1 +  r 6'T)p <  1 (25)
If 8 =  0, then only the stage game m atters. Cooperation does not arise and 
the INPV decreases with p. If 8 =  1 and T  tends to infinity, then k6,T(p) =  1 
for all p. So, J  =  G c: the constraint is satisfied for all ec(>  enc) and the first 
best is attained for all p. More generally, when condition (25) is not met, the 
effort is enc and decreases with p.
Consider now tha t (25) is satisfied. The following cases may be observed:
1) When (9) is not satisfied, e =  enc decreases with p. This happens in each 
point when 8 and T  are very low (the limit level depends on / ) .
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2) W hen (9) is satisfied and not binding at the first best, ec =  e* does not 
depend on the union’s bargaining power. This happens when 6 and T  are large 
enough. This case arises in many points when at the first best level of effort, 
G° is largely above the cost curve, here the 45 degree line, and closely below 
J .
3) W hen (9) is binding before attaining the first best, ec is chosen so th a t (9) 
is binding. We study how ec varies with p  by considering the implicit function 
x 6,T such that:
z 5, (p, ec) =  ( 1  -  r  ’ p ) f ( e c) -  ec -  
The partial derivatives satisfy:
=  0  (26)
=  - ( T ^ j ^ ' ' I1' ( r ^ ) - r5,T/{eC) <27>
d x  8'T
^  ( p , e c) =  ( 1  — r 6'Tp ) f ,(ec) — 1 (28)
Using the implicit function theorem, when the partial derivative J ^ 5,T(p, ec) 
is non zero, ec/(p) is given by:
cl ,   ^ _  d x 6’T/ d p
d x ^ / d e ^ ' 6 ^
( T ^ i / ' - i r ( i ^ ) + ^ r / ( ec)
( 1  — r 6,Tp ) f f(ec) — 1 
Remember tha t f ( e c) >  }'(&*) =  1. Then, three subcases arise:
(29)
when 1 — r s'Tp >  max{ > p ]  0 e: the slope of G c is higher than  the 
slope of the 45 degree line), the cooperative effort increases with the
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entrepreneur’s bargaining power if and only if the num erator of e°'(p) is 
positive, th a t is when:
r s,T
>  - < T ^ 7 (7 r ' ' ' ( r b )  ,30)
Call X*( p ,  ec) the right hand side of this condition. Since / '  =  <
0, X>(p,  ec) is positive. According to the sign of f ' ' , it may increase or 
decrease with p.
when p <  1 — r 6,Tp  <  (ie: the slope of G° is lower than the slope of
the 45 degree line), then the cooperative effort increases with the union 
power if and only if (30) is satisfied.
when p  <  1 — r 5,Tp =  then ec =  f '~ l [ l / ( l  — r 6,Tp)  is an explicit
function of p  and decreases with p.
Therefore, if (9) is satisfied and binding, when r 6,T <  m in { ~  1, X* ( p ,  ec), ~[1 — 
jr^ y]}, i.e. when 8 and T  are high enough, the cooperative effort increases 
with the union bargaining power. When r 5-T >  m a . x { X f  (p, ec), j [ l  -  
i.e. when 8 and T  are low enough, the cooperative effort decreases with p. 
When p  and ec can take values such that  ^ — 1 >  r 6,T E (m in{A^(p, ec), ~[1 — 
ec), ^ [ 1  -  y r^y]}), i.e. when 8 and T  are “m oderately” high, 
the cooperative effort decreases with the union power. □
U n c e r ta in ty  so lved  b e fo re  c o n tra c tin g  w b  : Assume tha t 2  —> 
is strictly increasing in the state  z  to be revealed at the beginning of stage B 
and uniformly distributed in [0.1]. When he observes z, the entrepreneur does
not deviate if and only if the realized return is such that:
«  .« -A ^  ^  lE f  ^  “  £C -  -  e"C)]/ ( e •>Z ) S WU
p(  1 -  8)
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Here, everything depends on the distribution of the random  variable ( z  E 
[0 , 1 ]). If there exists a ec such tha t / ( e c, 1 ) satisfies (31) for 8 and T , then the 
highest ec verifying this is chosen. While adequate 8 and T can help satisfy 
the inequality above, they may not be sufficient. W hen for all ec, / ( e c, 1 ) does 
not satisfy (31), the workers face the constraint (31) when choosing their level 
of effort and therefore the only equilibrium is no cooperation: enc. The point 
is tha t for all ec, there exists a z  such tha t z  >  z  implies tha t their wage will 
be ies(enc). Anticipating this and given tha t the returns are strictly increasing 
with z, the workers will act as though the expectation was reduced and choose 
a lower level of effort, which reduces the expectation of the returns. Repeating 
this, we obtain tha t the only possible level of effort is enc. □
S k e tch  o f P r o o f  o f P ro p o s it io n  5 : Consider th a t the incum bent en­
trepreneur M has a bargaining power p  E (p5 ,Pr)- Since wb  can either increase 
or decrease with p, respectively either S or R could earn from taking over. 
The workers anticipate this and choose an effort such th a t no raider has an 
incentive to breach implicit contracts. Instead of one entrepreneur’s incentive 
compatibility (IC) constraint, the cooperative effort must satisfy the IC con­
straint of all possible raiders. Depending on 8 and T, p r and p s may or may 
not be such tha t the additional constraints are binding. As in Proposition 2 , 
in case of threat, the workers reduce their cooperative effort so as to prevent 
the takeover. If this is not enough, the takeover cost even under the non coop­
erative effort is too low to prevent the takeover. Everything is as in the stage 
game and the toughest raider takes the firm over. □
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Chapter 3
Competition, Investment 
and Vertical Integration
A b stra ct
This chapter analyzes the impact of competition among downstream 
firms on a supplier’s investment and on her incentive to vertically in­
tegrate. It argues that tougher competition decreases the downstream 
industry profit, but improves the supplier’s negotiation position. In 
particular, the supplier is better off encouraging competition when the 
downstream firms have high bargaining power. Whether vertical inte­
gration occurs with a concentrated or a competitive downstream market 
depends on the demand and cost curves, the impact of investment and 
the bargaining game. The possibility of vertical integration may consti­
tute a barrier to entry and may trigger strategic horizontal spin-offs or 
mergers.
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1 In tro d u ctio n
This chapter studies the impact of competition between downstream firms on 
a monopoly supplier’s incentive to engage in industry-specific investment and 
to vertically integrate one downstream firm. The downstream firms compete 
both to buy input from the supplier and to sell output to consumers. Hence, 
fiercer competition among downstream firms has two opposite effects on the 
supplier’s surplus: it erodes the downstream industry profit, but it improves 
the supplier’s negotiation position, i.e. she gets a larger share of a lower in­
dustry profit. In a world of incomplete contracts, the supplier’s incentives to 
engage in an industry-specific investment increases with the industry surplus 
and the share of the industry surplus she captures. As a result, more down­
stream  competition may either increase or decrease the supplier’s investment, 
total industry output, consumer surplus and social welfare. In particular, we 
show that the supplier is better off with a competitive downstream industry in 
situations where her bargaining position would otherwise be weak. Building on 
these results, we analyze the case where the supplier vertically integrates one 
downstream firm. Since this affects the total quantity supplied and the number 
of active downstream firms, the decision to vertically integrate depends on the 
market environment.
Consider an industry where a monopoly supplier sells an input to down­
stream  firms competing both for the input and on the output m arket. The 
supplier can invest to increase the demand for the downstream firms’ output 
(e.g. in quality). The benefit from trade increases with the supplier’s invest­
ment. We consider a world of incomplete contracts where the trade contract 
between the supplier and each downstream firm is not observable to the other 
parties and cannot be made contingent on outputs. Hence, competition as 
measured by the num ber of downstream firms has two effects: on the one 
hand, fiercer com petition between downstream firms improves the negotiation 
position of the supplier. It leads the downstream firms to make higher bids for
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the supplier’s input. This negotiation effect alone makes competition favor ex 
ante investment as the supplier receives a larger share of the surplus generated 
by her investment. On the other hand, the transfer is contingent on the to tal 
industry profit which is reduced by more competition in the output m arket, i.e. 
there is a rent reduction effect1. Thus, competition has an ambiguous effect 
on the supplier’s surplus, investment and the social surplus. In particular, in 
situations where the supplier obtains a small share of a non competitive down­
stream industry profit, she is better off with a more competitive downstream 
industry.
Following the above reasoning, the possibility of vertical integration is an­
alyzed. We assume tha t vertical integration gives the owner of the integrated 
firm residual return rights, but makes this integrated firm bear some cost2. 
We investigate the interaction between the competitive environment and the 
decision to vertically integrate: since the firms have no alternative source of 
supply, vertical integration leads to total foreclosure and monopolization of the 
downstream market. Thus, the supplier’s surplus under integration does not 
depend on the number of downstream firms while the supplier’s payoff under 
non-integration is subject to the effects explained above. W hen the rent reduc­
tion (resp. negotiation) effect dominates, vertical integration is most valuable 
when there is a high (resp. low) level of competition.
Suppose tha t downstream firms may initially enter the m arket freely. The 
mere possibility of vertical integration may act as a barrier to entry: potential 
entrants into the downstream market can be deterred if they anticipate tha t 
their entry would trigger vertical integration which would in turn  imply market 
foreclosure. W hen there is no entry, but when the downstream firms may
*An example for this argument is provided by the case of the European telecommunica­
tions suppliers which used to enjoy a close relationship with state monopolies. The prospect 
of deregulation eventually leading to some competition between national telecom companies 
is widely believed to constitute a pressure on suppliers as well.
2Vertical integration may come with agency costs (Cremer (1994)) as well as legal or 
informational costs.
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separate or merge, horizontal mergers or spin-offs may take place in order to 
prevent vertical integration. From the supplier’s viewpoint, the mere threat of 
vertical integration may act as a disciplining device for downstream firms.
The literature on second-sourcing (Farrell and Gallini (1988)) identifies pri­
vate incentives to promote competition: when demand increases with a good- 
specific investment from consumers, a monopolist may want to a ttrac t com­
petition (e.g. by licensing its technology) to commit to charge low prices in 
the future so as to induce the buyers to invest more3. In this setup, a firm 
wants to a ttrac t competition in its own industry to induce a trading partner 
to invest. In addition, the incentive to promote com petition in the present 
chapter affects the supplier’s investment itself. Raj an (1992) develops a the­
ory of arm ’s-length debt related to our negotiation effect where arm ’s-length 
debt reduces the creditors’ bargaining power. However, in his paper, the lower 
bargaining position of creditors is due to their inability to acquire information 
about the borrower rather than competition.
The rent reduction effect is related to the change-in-the-relative-value-of- 
actions effect and to the profit reduction effect present in H erm alin’s (1992) 
and Schm idt’s (1994) papers on competition and managerial slack. Hermalin 
shows that competition affects the relative value of effort. He also points out 
that whether the owner or the manager has the bargaining power when the 
m anager’s compensation is decided crucially affects the efficiency consequences 
of competition. In Schm idt’s paper, competition increases the probability of 
liquidation, which induces the manager to work more in order to  avoid a utility 
loss associated with liquidation, but it may also decrease the value of a cost 
decreasing effort, which lowers his incentives to exert an effort4. These papers, 
however, consider competition in only one market. In particular, the m anager 
supplies one firm and her investment adversely affects com petitors. In contrast,
3Shepard (1987) develops a similar argument for a commitment to quality.
4Previous papers in this area consider frameworks where competition primarily affects 
the informational structure (Scharfstein (1988)).
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our supplier can supply a large num ber of downstream firms and her investment 
benefits the whole industry.
The present chapter is closely related to the literature on vertical relation­
ships and m arket foreclosure in which an upstream  firm can appropriate (some 
of) the downstream industry profit via exclusivity contracts, (price) discrimi­
nation and /or vertical integration (see Rey and Tirole’s (1996) survey). In this 
literature, the supplier is better off reducing com petition in the downstream 
industry. W hile this argument also appears in this chapter, we further argue 
tha t downstream competition may be desirable to the supplier as it enables her 
to increase her share of the downstream industry profit. The papers closest in 
spirit to ours are Bolton and W hinston (1991, 1993) (hereafter BW) and espe­
cially Hart and Tirole (1990) (hereafter HT) who consider a framework where 
one or two upstream  firms supply two downstream firms competing both for 
input and in the output market. They analyze conditions favoring vertical in­
tegration, when vertical integration leads to m arket foreclosure and when it is 
socially desirable. These papers, however, do not analyze the suppliers’ private 
incentives to promote competition.
Although it has often been overlooked in 10 theory, the analysis of pri­
vate and public incentives to promote competition in vertically related m ar­
kets is of practical im portance for both firms and regulators. For instance, 
following a change in the regulatory environment, AT&T has recently decided 
to divest its supplier AT&T Technology so as to prom ote competition among 
downstream firms (Rey and Tirole (1996)). Under integration, AT&T Tech­
nology could not have com m itted not to discriminate against AT&T’s rivals. 
The rivals would then have turned to alternative suppliers. The short-term 
gains from monopolization would have been more than offset by the long-term 
costs of the subsequent new relationships and competition. In this chapter, 
increasing downstream competition aims at improving the negotiation posi­
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tion, but it may take place because of a supply assurance motive as well5. A 
good understanding of how these incentives depend on technology, demand or 
the competitive environment may guide contract design and decisions about 
vertical integration and spin-offs as well as com petition policy.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 
3  describes the negotiation and rent reduction effects and derives costs and 
benefits of competition. Section 4 develops a theory of vertical integration 
based on the m arket environment. Section 5 concludes.
2 T h e M od el
A monopoly supplier S  produces an input tha t she can sell to n downstream 
firms Th, ..., D n competing in quantities in an output m arket. The supplier’s 
production cost is C ( Q )  =  c Q 2/ 2, where Q  is the to tal quantity of input 
she produces. The supplier can raise the demand on the output m arket by 
undertaking an investment e E IR+ at cost 7 (e) =  e3/3  (she can invest in 
advertising for the output or in R&D or quality of the input leading in turn  
to a higher quality for the ou tpu t6). More specifically, the inverse demand 
function in the output is P ( Q )  =  ve  — Q,  with v > 07. The downstream firms 
need one unit of the input to produce one unit of the homogeneous output. 
Downstream firm D{ has a zero production cost and has no alternative supply 
source. The tim ing is the following:
• in stage 0 , S  decides whether to integrate one downstream firm or not.
• in stage 1 , S  chooses her investment e and incurs 7 (e),
5Although vertical integration may take place for a supply assurance motive (Emons 
(1996)), this motive may also lead a firm to promote competition upstream to insure against 
a potential inability of one of its suppliers to supply the good.
6The argument holds as well when the supplier’s investment reduces her marginal cost 
and does not affect demand.
7When e =  0, there is no exchange in the downstream market and thus no exchange in 
the input market.
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• in stage 2 , S  and the downstream firms bargain over quantities of input 
and transfers. S  supplies the downstream firms who produce and sell in 
the downstream market.
Our contractual assumptions are similar to those in HT.
A ss u m p tio n  1 ; The supp lier’s investment is observable, but non verifiable. 
A ss u m p tio n  2 ; Downstream  f i r m s ’ production is not contractible.
There may be several technical reasons why parties might be unable or 
reluctant to sign such contracts. For instance, there may be a probability that 
a technological innovation or a shock creates an alternative source of supply 
whose use is not verifiable or decreases the supplier’s cost. Hence, a contract 
may lead downstream firms to give away excessive rents to the supplier8.
A ss u m p tio n  3 ; Contracts and transactions between the supplier and any of  
the downstream firm s are not observable by the other downstream firm s.
HT thoroughly justify this assumption. In particular, they stress the diffi­
culty for a downstream firm to “monitor or control shipments m ade by to 
other parties without having residual rights of control over the assets of [5], 
including buildings, trucks and inventories.” Given this assum ption, contracts 
conditional on other contracts (in particular exclusive dealing contracts) are 
not feasible: W hen she negotiates with one downstream firm, the supplier can­
not commit not to supply inputs to other downstream firms9. Since contracts 
are unobservable, there is no possible precommitment via a contract (see Katz
8For instance, in the 80s, British Gas signed a contract with North Sea gas producers 
where it committed to buy gas at a price which is today higher than the market price. The 
producers are reluctant to renegotiate this contract which proves very costly to British Gas.
9Any other motive for the supplier not to be able or willing to commit to supply only 
a limited amount to the industry would do the trick. For instance, allowing for several 
production periods might induce the supplier to keep com petition to play the downstream  
firms against one another in a “once out always out” setup.
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(1991)). More specifically, S  cannot induce the downstream firms to undertake 
ex post inefficient actions in the output m arket.
Furtherm ore, we assume that there is no trade between the downstream 
firms. This may be the case, for instance, when only the supplier has the 
technology to design the input for the use of each downstream firm or the 
ability to transport the input.
The surplus generated is divided through bargaining between the supplier 
and the downstream firms. The bargaining game between S  and Di is as 
follows: with probability a , S  simultaneously makes each Di a take-it-or-leave- 
it offer of quantity qs j  against a transfer Ts,i- Then, each Di either accepts 
or rejects the offer it was made. W ith probability 1 — a , all downstream 
firms simultaneously make take-it-or-leave-it offers {^ ,5 , ^ , 5 }, i =  1, . . . ,  n to S. 
Then, S  either accepts or rejects each offer10. The param eter a  can be thought 
of as the supplier’s bargaining power. W hen the quantity qi is exchanged 
against a transfer Tt-, D^s  profit ttt- is given by:
7rt- =  (ve  -  Q )q{ -  Ti ( 1 )
where Q =  YLj= 1 Qj- S ’s surplus U  is given by:
U =  f 2 T i - c Q 2/ 2 - ' !(e)  (2)
1 = 1
and her reservation utility is normalized to 0. The consumer surplus11 is 
C S  =  Q 212 , so tha t the social welfare S W  can be written:
SW  -  U  +  i t  7Ti +  (75 =  [ve -  (1 +  c ) Q / 2 ] Q  -  e3/3  (3)
1=1
10This bargaining game could be seen as an extension of the one in BW  (1991) and HT. 
B W ’s game with two downstream firms considers a similar structure, but with only one unit 
traded. In HT, only the supplier makes the offers and he offers a menu to the downstream  
firms.
11 Although here CS  is proportional to Q2, there is no reason for CS  to be comonotonic 
with Q  with a more general inverse demand curve P ( e , Q ) .
81
We assume that an (out-of-equilibrium) offer by 5  to a downstream firm 
cannot affect this firm’s beliefs about S ’s offer to another downstream firm12. 
This is natural because the offers are secret and S  tries to ex tract as much 
rent as she can from each downstream firm. This assumption rules out any 
m anipulation of beliefs and will guarantee the uniqueness of the pure strategy 
Perfect Bayesian Equilibria we shall derive.
Last, we assume that the owner of a production u n it’s assets is entitled to 
all returns generated by this unit and all decision rights concerning produc­
tion and trade involving this unit. Ownership will m atter because of contract 
incompleteness. We followed the literature in assuming tha t no contract can 
be signed before the investment is made. The characteristics of the input may 
be difficult to write in a contract in advance13. We could have assumed that a 
state of nature is revealed after the investment is sunk. For clarity, we simply 
assume instead tha t contracts are not feasible at stage 0. As in Grossman and 
Hart (1986), different ownership structures will lead to different allocations of 
returns and thus to different incentives to invest.
Following BW and HT, we assume:
A ssu m p tio n  4 ; A vertically integrated structure m ust bear an agency cost A  
that a non integrated structure does not have to bear14.
Furthermore, S  merges with either 0  or 1 downstream firm. This may be 
either because a vertical structure with more than one downstream firm has to 
bear a prohibitively high agency cost or, as we shall see in section 4, because 
monopolization and to tal foreclosure in equilibrium make only the integration 
of one firm profitable.
12In that, we follow HT who call this assumption “market-by-market bargaining” .
13Grossman and Hart (1986), BW  and HT discuss this assumption at length.
14Another striking difference between the BW and H T’s approach that we follow here and 
Grossman and Hart’s (1986) theory is that the investment is industry specific rather than 
relationship specific.
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3 C osts  and  B en efits  o f  C o m p etitio n
In this section, we rule out the possibility of vertical integration in stage 0. 
We argue th a t downstream competition may either increase or decrease the 
supplier’s surplus and social welfare. We identify the negotiation and rent re­
duction effects and compare them  to the traditional dead-weight loss reduction 
effect of competition. We shall see tha t the level of downstream com petition 
resulting from free entry to the industry is not optim al in general and th a t the 
supplier may be better off with a competitive downstream industry.
In this simple moral hazard problem, the downstream firms cannot m onitor 
the supplier’s investment. As a benchmark, we first discuss cases where offers 
and transactions are publicly observable.
If she could offer a contract to all downstream firms and to the consumers, 
the supplier would appropriate the whole surplus from trade. Thus, she would 
maximize this surplus and eliminate the dead-weight loss, i.e. the perfect 
competition quantity would be produced, and she would undertake the socially 
optimal level of investment. A contract offer from the downstream firms or 
the consumers would also lead to the perfect com petition quantity. However, 
underinvestment would arise from a hold-up problem: once the supplier has 
invested, the party making the offer can reap the whole surplus. Anticipating 
that she will get no reward from her investment, the supplier does not invest.
In our setup, however, a contract with the consumers cannot be signed15. 
If the supplier’s offers were publicly observable, they would satisfy:
C r A 1 2
m a x ( g s ) t M T s , t )  E Ts,i -  9  [ E 9s,i\ (4)
i= i ^ i= l
s .t .  Ts ,i <  {ve -  qS - i  -  qs,i)qs,i , Vz E { 1 , . . . ,  n }
The downstream firms’ participation constraints are binding. In equilib­
rium, the monopoly quantity Q =  v e / { 2  +  c) is exchanged. Any allocation of
15An interpretation is that there are many small consumers who can free-ride.
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the monopoly quantity  among downstream firms is an equilibrium. In stage 1, 
the supplier chooses the investment so as to maximize her expected surplus:
ve
max [ve — - ----- ]
ve ve
2  +  c 2  -f - c 
The first best solution is16:
■2 T c- - 7 ( e ) (5)
eFB =  i>2 / ( 2  +  c) (6 )
Q fb  =  „3/(2  +  c) 2 (7)
For a given e, the to tal quantity produced is (not surprisingly) the monopoly 
quantity. Under complete information, S  can commit to sell a given am ount 
of input to the industry and appropriate the whole industry surplus, which 
is maximized under the monopoly quantity. Thus, the supplier’s investment, 
industry production and social welfare do not depend on n. Note tha t the first- 
best is regardless of whether the offer is made before or after the investment is 
sunk and whether the downstream firms can coordinate or not.
If, instead, the downstream firms were to make take-it-or-leave-it offers
to the supplier and were able to coordinate, they would choose the monopoly
quantity ex post, but the hold-up problem would result in no investment. Here, 
the firms cannot coordinate. Given the simultaneity assumption, whether the 
offers are secret or not is irrelevant. The case where the downstream firms 
make the offers is studied in the next subsection.
From now on, we assume that the transactions between the supplier and a 
downstream are not observable to other downstream firms. In this setup, we 
shall see tha t the supplier is unable to credibly commit to a low production or 
not to supply some firms.
16Throughout the chapter, e =  0 will not satisfy the second order condition.
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3.1 T he N egotiation  Effect
We first set a  =  0, i.e. the downstream firms simultaneously make contract 
offers to the supplier. We solve the problem by backward induction and first 
determ ine the parties’ payoffs in stage 2 . ZVs program can be written:
m ax(,i S)Tt S) (ve  -  qa_{ -  qi,s)qi,s ~  TifS (8 )
s . t .  2 ™ +  Ti,s -  f  [qti  +  « , s ] 2 >  T “i gi=0 -  |  [A , i = 0 ] 2 (9)
where q*{ and T “t- (resp. q l i tqi= 0 and T “i qi=z0) denote the sum of the 
quantities and transfers tha t S  is expected to exchange with all firms but 
D{ when Di  s offer is accepted (resp. refused) by S.  In other words, Di s offer 
maximizes 7r“ under 5 ’s individual rationality (IR) constraint17. The IR con­
straint is binding in each D^s  program. Therefore, the reaction functions are 
(2 +  c)qi — ve  — (1 +  c ) q or qi =  ve — (1 +  c)Q“, for all i. The quantity q 
bought by each firm satisfies:
< 7 = 7 -----------  (10)
( 1  +  c)n +  1
For a given e, we are in the traditional Cournot case and the corresponding 
industry Cournot quantity Q =  nq  increases with the num ber of downstream 
firms. The subsequent reduction in the dead-weight loss tends to make compe­
tition desirable. Furthermore, the average offer per unit T ( q ) / q  =  c(2n — 1 )q 
increases with n. This is due to ^ ’s increasing marginal cost of production.
The supplier’s surplus is:
17The subscript —i  takes into account that offers from other firms may be rejected and 
that some transactions may not take place. A priori, the sets of the other downstream firms 
which are expected to trade with the supplier when D{  s offer is accepted or rejected are not 
identical. In equilibrium, however, all offers are accepted. This implies that these sets are 
identical and that the IR constraint specifies that the transfer offer must be at least equal to 
S”s cost of supplying g,- units to D i  when q^ _i units are expected to be supplied to the other 
downstream firms.
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and increases with n for a given e. This result is due to the increasing marginal 
cost of production. The supplier chooses her investment so as to maximize her 
surplus, which leads to:
cn(n — l ) v 2 
e(n) =  [ ( 1 +  c)n  +  l ] 2
Since U =  e3 / 6  >  0, S ’s IR constraint is satisfied. The supplier’s investment
and utility  both increase with n. This effect of com petition on investment 
makes the to tal quantity increase with n. Moreover, it is easy to see from ( 1 1 ) 
tha t investment increases with n for two reasons. F irst, more competition 
increases the total quantity exchanged. Second, more com petition increases 
the offers made by downstream firms to the supplier for the units they buy 
and hence ^ ’s share of the surplus. We call this la tte r effect the negotiation 
effect. Moreover, as e and Q  increase, the consumer surplus C S  =  Q 2 /  2 and 
social welfare increase as well.
L e m m a  1  ; When a  =  0, as the number of  downstream f irms  increases, the 
negotiat ion and dead-weight loss reduction effects both lead to an increase in:
• the f i r m s ’ average offers,
• the suppl ier ’s investment  and surplus,
• total  production and the consumer surplus,
•  social welfare.
The negotiation effect leads downstream firms to make offers to S  which 
increase with the degree of competition as measured by the num ber of down­
stream  firms. When n increases, the total demand for the input and the average
transfer per unit of input both increase. The key ingredient for this result is 
the increasing marginal cost (the investment is unnecessary). W hile it is mod­
eled through an increasing marginal cost, such an effect is robust to a number 
of alternative specifications of the bargaining procedure. This effect is absent 
in BW because they assumed zero marginal cost for the supplier. In HT, the 
offers are always made by the upstream  firms and this effect is ignored.
Assume now that in stage 0 the supplier publicly picks n potentially active 
downstream firms (n <  N  where N  is a, large num ber of potential downstream 
firms). For instance, one may think tha t she has to communicate her technology 
to n downstream firms in stage 0 for them  to be potentially active later. Then, 
in equilibrium, the supplier picks as many downstream firms as she can, i.e. N .  
Since the supplier has no bargaining power, she promotes com petition (rather 
than foreclose the market) between the downstream firms to induce them  to 
make higher offers.
3.2 T he R ent R eduction  Effect
We now set a  =  1 . The supplier makes simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers 
to all downstream firms which satisfy:
n. 2c
maiW T Sii) ( i4 )
i=l L i=1
s. t .  (ve  -  qa_{ -  qS,i)qs,i >  Ts,i
Each downstream firm ’s IR constraint is binding. For a given investment 
level, the quantity offered to each firm is, as in the preceding subsection, the 
Cournot quantity determined by (10). The dead-weight loss reduction effect is 
still present.
The transfer proposed to each downstream firm is T  =  (ve  — n q ) q , tha t is 
each downstream firm’s Cournot revenue18. Therefore, the supplier’s expected 
surplus ex ante can be written:
18Note that these results also hold if, instead of assuming that S offers Ts^}, we
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leading to:
U =  [2nve — (c +  2 )n 2q]q/2 — 7 (e) (15)
;V2e2 — 7 (e) (16)(cn +  2  )n 2 2
2 [ ( 1  +  c)n +  I]'
=  - ' v Z t r n ?  (17)
«<"> = "V [ ( l+CWc)+n 2+ l-F (18)
s [(1 +  c)n + 2 ]m>2 e2 3
5 ^ (n) =  2 [(l +  c)n +  ip  “ e / 3
6n3(cn +  2)2[(3 +  c)n +  2]
=  -  ------ 6 [ ( l + c ) n + l ] « ------  (19)
whose derivatives can be written:
t( \ 2 2{n 1 ) /"on\e In) =  —v — --------------—  (2 0 )
v '  [ (1  +  c)n +  l ]3 v '
n [4 +  n(c  -  2)]
« '< "»  ■  ' ‘ p S #  1211
SW'{n) = „V(„ + 2)=^±e±^ («,
Thus, e and U =  e3 / 6  is decreasing in the num ber of firms. Since the 
supplier appropriates the industry surplus which decreases with the number of 
downstream firms, she invests more when the num ber of firms decreases: we 
refer to this as the rent reduction effect of competition. The to tal quantity, how­
ever, may either increase or decrease with n, as the rent reduction effect con­
flicts with the traditional static quantity increase due to fiercer com petition19.
consider that S  offers a menu T s ti(q i)  to each D i  (restricting to increasing transfer functions) 
and each D i  then picks its quantity.
19Note that the linear price charged by the downstream firms to the consumer is
. v 3 n (c n  -f l)(cn  +  2)
*»> = ~ i ( r + c ) " + i ] ~
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The consumer surplus C S  =  Q 2 / 2  decreases with n  when n ( 2  —c) > 4. S W ' (n )  
is positive if and only if 4n <  ( 2  +  c) +  y ( 2  +  c) 2 +  16. S W  decreases with 
the num ber of firms when n is not too low and c is not too large. A low level 
of downstream competition may be socially desirable because of the effect of 
com petition on the industry-specific investment.
L e m m a  2 ; When a  =  I, as the number o f  downstream f i rm s  increases, the 
rent reduction effect conflicts with the dead-weight loss reduction effect and  
leads to a decrease in:
• the suppl ie r ’s investment  and surplus,
• production and the consumer surplus when n (2 — c) >  4,
social welfare when 4n >  (2 +  c) -f y j (2 +  c) 2 +  16.
In particular, the supplier’s investment is maximized under monopoly. The 
hold-up here is by both the downstream firms and the consumer. The consumer 
indirectly appropriates part of the surplus created by the supplier’s investment. 
Since the supplier cannot discriminate, she benefits from a less competitive 
environment which enables her to extract a larger part of the consumer surplus. 
W hen the rent reduction effect dominates, the consumer might be better off 
signing a contract with one or several downstream firms to commit not to play 
the downstream firms against each other. Doing so would induce the supplier 
to invest more, which would make the consumer better off.
The argum ent is fairly robust. For instance, it holds with or without fixed 
costs, when S ’s surplus comes from profit sharing or two-part tariffs and when 
the investment and production take place simultaneously20.
whose derivative
n  . v 3 [— Zen2 +  2(c — 2)n +  2]
=  -------- [(1 +  C) „ + 1]4--------
is negative as  soon as n >  1. In this setup, the price is decreasing in the number of firms.
20This result could be seen as a wedge between the Schumpeterian argument of dynamic ef­
ficiency and the Hicksian argument that monopoly rents weaken incentives for cost reduction.
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The rent reduction effect would obtain in H T ’s framework with one up­
stream  firm and n downstream firms. In their setup with two downstream 
firms and one upstream  firm, the upstream  firm makes the contract offers and 
her utility is contingent on downstream firms’ profit. Had they focused on the 
effect of downstream competition, they would have obtained our rent reduction 
effect. Here, we start from the observation tha t when there are less downstream 
firms, the supplier suffers less from her inability to supply them  all.
If, in stage 0, the supplier can choose the num ber of potentially active down­
stream  firms, she forecloses the market (n =  1 ). Given tha t she has all the 
bargaining power, she appropriates the whole industry surplus which is maxi­
mized under monopoly. Thus, the supplier’s choice of downstream competition 
crucially depends on her bargaining power.
The rent reduction effect is to be contrasted with the literature on linear 
pricing. Consider the following m arket game: the supplier chooses her in­
vestment and sets a linear price t ; then, each downstream firm chooses the 
quantity to buy at th a t price so as to maximize 7rt- =  (ve  — t — which
leads to qi =  (ve — t ) / ( n  -f 1 ). Hence, the supplier will choose e and t so as to 
maximize t Q  — cQ 2 j 2  — 7 (e), tha t is:
/ x n t ( v e - t )  9 / v e  — t \ 2 ,  . , .
(e ,t)  G a rg m a x -----------------cn ( ----------) — e /3  (23)
n +  1 v n +  1 7
The first order conditions of this program are t =  [ ( 1 +  2c)n +  l]ue/2 [(l +  
cn) +  1 ] and (n +  l ) t  — 2 cn(ve  — t) =  (n -f 1 )2 e2 /n u , which leads to:
e(n)  =  n v 212[(1 +  c)n +  1] (24)
Q (n)  =  n u e /2 [(l +  c)n +  1 ] =  n 2v 3/ 4 [ ( l  +  c)n  +  l ] 2 (25)
W ith linear pricing, e and U  both increase with n. Q  and S W  increase with 
n more than in the absence of investment. More competition leads downstream 
firms to buy and produce more for a given t. Thus, the supplier’s marginal
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revenue of investment is higher and hence her incentive to invest is higher. 
Social welfare increases not only because (for a given investm ent) a higher 
quantity is exchanged, but also because a higher n increases the investm ent21. 
This result, however, is very sensitive to the assum ption of linear pricing. If 
the supplier offered a general menu a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing
scheme, she could appropriate all or part of the downstream firm s’ profits and 
the rent reduction effect of Lemma 2 would hold22.
3.3 C osts and B enefits o f C om petition
Analyzing two polar cases (a  =  0 and a  =  1 ) enabled us to identify two an­
tagonistic effects of competition to be added to the dead-weight loss reduction 
effect. We address now the trade-off between these effects. More com petition 
between downstream firms improves the supplier’s negotiation position, but 
decreases the industry profit. For a  E [0,1], we obtain the following proposi­
tion:
P ro p o s it io n  1  ; The effect of  competi t ion on the suppl ie r ’s investment  and 
surplus, total  production, the consumer surplus and social welfare depends on 
the suppl ie r ’s bargaining power. In particular:
• there exist ( a i , a 2) such that e and U both increase with n when a  <  a \ ,  
decrease with n when a  >  <*2, and f irs t increase and then decrease with 
n when a  E (<*1 , 0 :2 ),
• there exists < * 3  such that Q and C S  increase with n when a  < <*3 . When  
a  > <*3 , Q and C S  m ay  either decrease or  f irs t  increase and then decrease
21This result would also hold if the investment were a consumer’s decision variable. The 
only difference with our setup would be that the downstream firms’ decision variable affecting 
the investment would be the price they would charge to the consumer, while in the result 
above it was the quantity they bought from the supplier.
220u r approach in this section could also be seen as a principal-agent relationship in the 
style of Maskin and Tirole (1992) where the principal performs hidden actions (the sale to 
other downstream firms). Given the degree of competition in the downstream market, the 
supplier’s hidden action enters the downstream firms’ objective function. Here, as soon as 
n >  2, the supplier is strictly worse off than if the downstream firms could observe her action.
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with n,
•  there exist (0 4 , 0 5 ) such that when a  <  0 4 , S W  increases with n and 
when a  >  as ,  S W  either decreases or f irst  increases and then decreases 
with n.
P ro o f: See Appendix. □
The investment, to tal quantity and consumer surplus may be maximized 
under a concentrated, m oderately competitive or very com petitive downstream 
industry, depending on which effect dominates. Social welfare depends on the 
three effects and may take various shapes (especially when a  E (0 4 , 0 5 )). It 
also appears th a t a degree of com petition maximizing social welfare does not 
in general maximize the supplier’s surplus and investment.
W hen she has high bargaining power, the supplier appropriates a large 
share of the downstream industry profit while the effect of com petition on the 
downstream firms’ offers is not very im portant. She is thus bette r off facing a 
non competitive downstream industry. In contrast, when her bargaining power 
is low, she appropriates a small share of the industry profit in the absence of 
competition. Competition increases her share of the industry profit.
C o ro lla ry  1  ; Assume that the suppl ier  can choose the number n <  N  of  
potentially active downstream f irms.  Then, there exists (O i,o 2) such that she 
chooses n =  N  when a  <  a \ ,  n =  1 when a  > o 2 and a l imited number of  
downstream f irms when a  E ( o i ,o 2).
Having limited bargaining power leads the supplier to prom ote competition. 
Note th a t the number of downstream firms chosen will not be socially optimal 
in general.
Assume now tha t in stage 0, the downstream firms enter the m arket at cost 
/  > 0. They enter as long as their expected profit is positive, i.e.:
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( 1  -  a ) ( 2  +  c)i)2e2 / 2 [(l +  c)n  +  l ]2 >  / (26)
C o ro lla ry  2  : Entry  at cost f  m ay  result in either too m any  or  too few  down­
stream f irms  f rom  the suppl ier’s and social viewpoints.  An entry  tax/subs idy  
can increase efficiency.
Entry by a downstream firm creates an externality on the other downstream 
firms, the supplier’s investment and the consumer surplus. The equilibrium 
num ber of downstream firms is in general different from a num ber maximizing 
social welfare. Note tha t the supplier’s investment is a public good for down­
stream  firms. Each of them  would like to have the others give away a larger 
share of their profits to the supplier: they would benefit from the subsequent 
higher investment. A social planner can fine tune /  via a lum p-sum  tax  or sub­
sidy so as to make the equilibrium number of firms coincide with an optimal 
number.
4 V ertica l In tegra tion
In this section, we investigate the incentive for the supplier to vertically in­
tegrate one downstream firm23. First consider how vertical integration affects 
bargaining and production in stage 2 :
L e m m a  3 ; Under vertical integration, the supplier suppl ies her  subsidiary  
only. She supplies the monopoly quantity Q m =  ue / ( 2  +  c).
P ro o f: See Appendix. □
Since she obtains all the returns of the vertical structure, the supplier can 
appropriate the whole industry surplus by supplying only the firm she owns.
23As in HT, since we allow general transfers and in particular two-part tariffs, there is no 
double marginalisation that vertical integration might aim at eliminating.
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This surplus is maximized under the monopoly quantity. If she supplies an­
other downstream firm, she will supply more than the monopoly quantity in 
equilibrium. Thus, the only equilibrium is tha t S  supplies the monopoly quan­
tity  to her downstream firm and does not supply any other firm. There is 
monopolization and to tal foreclosure (here, the absence of an outside option 
for downstream firms is crucial. The payoff to the integrated structure does 
not depend on the number of firms in the market.
We now study the supplier’s incentive to vertically integrate one down­
stream  firm. We first set a  =  0. Given the agency cost A  of vertical integration, 
the supplier integrates only if:
U v z _ U m  =  _  ( 2  -f c )Q m/ 2 ] Q m — A — cn(n — \ ) q  / 2
v 2e2 cn in  — l)u 2 e2
- A ~  o r / i  ■ /  . n 9  ^  0  ( 2 7 )2(2 T c) 2[(1 T  c)n -(- l ] 2
Thus, there is vertical integration when the num ber of downstream firms
2 2 2 2 
is low enough provided tha t f(2+c)(i+c)2 ^  A  ^  2(24 )^ A  *s higher than
this upper bound, there is never vertical integration, while if it is lower than
the lower bound, vertical integration always takes place). W hen many firms
are in the downstream m arket, the supplier’s surplus is already quite high
under non-integration and the profit increase under vertical integration may
be outweighed by the agency cost. In contrast, when there are few downstream
firms, the payoff under non integration may be so low th a t vertical integration
is worthwhile.
We now set a  =  1 . S  integrates one downstream firm if and only if:
u «  _  uni _  (cn +  2 ) n v 2e2
U U ~  2 ( 2  +  c) ^  2 [ ( 1  +  c)n  + 1 ] 2 (28)
2 2
which occurs when n is large enough when 0 < A  <  2(2+c)(i+c)2 * ^ or suc^ values 
of A,  the benefit from vertical integration is higher than the agency cost only 
when the non integrated payoff is low enough, which occurs when n is large
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enough because of the rent reduction effect. These argum ents hold whether e 
is given or endogenous.
For a  6  [0,1], we obtain:
P ro p o s it io n  2  ; The suppl ie r’s incentive to integrate a downstream f irm may  
either increase or decrease with the number o f  downstream f i r m s . In particular, 
there exist ae and a? >  a& such that:
• when a  <  ae and A  is in a given interval, there is vertical integration
when the number of  downstream f irms is low enough.
•  when a  >  a 7 and A  is in a given interval, vertical integration is profitable
when the number of  downstream f irms is large enough.
P ro o f: See Appendix. □
The intuition is tha t under non-integration, competition leads the down­
stream  firms to make high offers, but restricts their profit. W hen the rent 
reduction effect dominates, the supplier’s payoff decreases with n under non­
integration while she has monopoly profit under integration. Thus, the incen­
tive to integrate increases with n. W hen the negotiation effect dominates, the 
opposite conclusion holds.
We showed tha t social welfare function under non-integration may take 
various shapes. Here, the effect of vertical integration on social welfare may 
be either positive or negative. In addition, since the consumer appropriates 
part of the surplus created by the supplier’s investment (even under vertical 
integration), the incentive to vertically integrate can be either too high or too 
low relative to the social optimum.
C o ro lla ry  3 : Some socially desirable vertical integrations m ay  not  take place, 
i.e. they m a y  not be privately  profitable.
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This result is to be contrasted with BW and HT who find th a t downstream 
com petition results in an excessive tendency towards vertical integration. Non 
desirable integration may appear in their model because the benefits from the 
vertical merger go to the merging parties, while the consumers are either worse 
off or unaffected24. Here, vertical integration may either increase or decrease 
the consumer surplus. In cases where the consumer surplus is higher under 
integration than under non-integration, the consumer would like to commit to 
give away part of his benefit but he cannot. A hold-up problem may arise due 
to the consum er’s opportunism, which may lead to non-integration even when 
integration is socially desirable.
W hen there is entry at stage 0, the setup cost /  affects the incentive to 
integrate. The number of downstream firms in equilibrium is sensitive to the 
possibility of vertical integration. W hen a  is low, a sufficiently low entry 
cost induces enough entry to prevent vertical integration. But a high entry 
cost constrains the downstream industry to a level of concentration sufficient 
to trigger vertical integration, which implies that only one downstream firm 
actually enters the market. W hen a  is high, a high entry cost leads to non- 
integration. But the possibility of vertical integration may reduce the number 
of entrants enticed by a low entry cost: a potential entrant which would have 
made a positive profit in the absence of vertical integration may realize that 
entry would trigger vertical integration and thus prefer to stay ou t25. Thus, 
the mere possibility of vertical integration can be a barrier to entry and can 
sustain profits in an industry.
C o ro lla ry  4 ; The possibili ty o f  vertical integration can be a barrier to entry.
24Kiihn and Vives (1994) study a model with product variety and with upstream monopoly 
and downstream monopolistic com petition. They identify conditions on consumer prefer­
ences under which vertical mergers are welfare improving or welfare reducing.
25In particular, a lump-sum tax or subsidy also affects entry via its impact on the incentive 
to integrate. Increasing /  can be welfare improving while reducing it can be socially harmful.
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Horizontal mergers and spin-offs may constitute an im portant decentralized 
way to prevent vertical integration and m arket foreclosure. Assume th a t there 
is no entry but tha t horizontal mergers and spin-offs are allowed. The down­
stream  firms may strategically merge or separate in order to prevent vertical 
integration and market foreclosure. They may be better off either separating 
and weakening their bargaining position (and maybe duplicating fixed costs) 
or merging and reducing their m arket share. This result holds, for instance, 
when the owners of two merging downstream firms share the profit equally 
and when two downstream firms resulting from a horizontal spin-off compete 
in quantities:
C o ro lla ry  5 ; Horizontal  integrations or  spin-offs m ay  take place in order to 
prevent vertical integration.
5 C on clu d in g  R em arks
The conflicting effects of competition on investment developed in this chapter 
are robust to a number of alternative specifications. For instance, they hold if, 
instead of assuming an increasing marginal cost for the supplier, downstream 
firms have a stochastic transform ation cost. However, a num ber of further steps 
are needed for a more thorough understanding of the economic consequences 
of competition in such a setup. F irst, one might expect tha t competition 
affects investment even when conditional contracts (and in particular exclusive 
dealing agreements) are allowed. Under this assumption, it would be useful to 
investigate, for instance, the case of several production periods. Second, the 
use of vertical restraints may also be affected by the com petitive environment.
In addition, the result of monopolization under vertical integration is very 
sensitive to the assumption tha t the downstream firms have no alternative 
source of supply. Upstream competition would probably affect the payoff of 
a vertical structure and thus the decision to integrate would depend both on
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the level of upstream  and downstream competition. Another direction is to 
investigate the dynamics of integration and separation. W hile we assumed 
that vertical integration is irreversible, vertical mergers and spin-offs may take 
place sequentially. This chapter suggests tha t a shift in the dem and curve or a 
change in the competitive environment may trigger such mergers or spin-offs.
Finally, it would be useful to analyze interactions between financial deci­
sions and inpu t/ou tpu t markets with such vertical relationships. For instance, 
financing decisions could affect the supplier’s marginal cost of production and 
thus the offers from the downstream firms. Alternatively, the supplier may 
choose to be financially constrained to commit not to produce too much input.
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APPENDIX:
P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s i t io n  1:
We saw th a t the quantities exchanged are Cournot quantities whether the 
offers are made by the downstream firms or the supplier. The expected payoff 
for downstream firms is:
7Tj =  (1 — a ) [ve  — nq — c(2n — l )q /2 ]q  (29)
and the supplier’s expected surplus can be written:
leading to:
e(n) = „ » *  o (c"  +  2 ) +  ( 1  -  a ) c { n  -  1 )
V ’ [ ( 1 +  c)n +  l ] 2 V ’
Q{n) = „V  ^cn + ^  + a - a M n - 1)
[(1 +  c)n  +  1J3
6 [ ( 1  +  c)n +  1]'
. c2(3 +  c ) ( n - l ) 2(n +  2)i
+ ( l - a ) - - € r + c ) n  +  l ] 6 j (33)
whose derivatives can be written:
e'(n)
Q'(n)
S W ' ( n )
=  v 2
=  v 3n
=  v 6n 2
(1 — a)c[(3 +  c)n — 1] — 2 a ( n  — 1 )
[ (1 +  c)n +  l ] 3 
a [4 +  n(c  — 2)] +  ( 1  — a)c[(4 -f c)n — 2] 
[ ( 1  +  c)n  +  l ]4 
(cn T 2)[—2n2 +  (2 +  cjn  T  2]
a
+ ( 1  -  a)
[ (1 +  c)n +  l ] 7
c2(3 +  c)(n — l)[n 2 +  (2 +  c)n — 1 ]
[ ( 1 +  c)n +  l ] 7
The supplier’s investment increases with n if and only if:
(34)
(35)
(36)
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( a 2 ~  <*)[2 +  c(3 +  c)]n >  ( a x -  a)(2  +  c) (37)
where au =  c/(c  +  2) <  c(3 +  c)/[2 +  c(3 +  c)] =  a 2. Therefore:
• when a  <  a 2, e increases with n,
• when a  >  a 2, e increases with n when n <  ( a —a i) ( c + 2 ) / ( a —a 2)[2+c(3+ 
c)] and decreases with n otherwise. Since the right hand side decreases 
in a  in [a2 , 1 ] from +oo to 1 , there exists a'2 such th a t e decreases with 
n when a  >  a'2. W hen a  tends to ar2, e increases with n. W hen a  £  
( a 2 , a 2 ), e first increases and then decreases with n.
The to tal production and the consumer surplus increase with n if and only
if:
(a 3 -  a)[2 +  c(3 +  c)]n >  2 (ai — a ) (2 +  c) (38)
where a 3 =  [c(4 +  c)/(2  +  c(3 +  c)] >  a i .  Therefore:
• when a  <  a 3, Q  increases with n,
• when a  >  a 3, Q  increases with n when n <  2 (a  — a i)(c  +  2 ) /( a  — a 3)[2 +  
c(3 +  c)] and decreases with n otherwise. The right hand side decreases 
in a  in [a2 , 1 ] from +oo to 4/(2 — c). When a  tends to a 3, Q increases 
with n. W hen c >  2, the limit of right hand side is negative and there
exists a f3 such tha t Q decreases with n when a  >  a 3 and first increases
and then decreases with n when a  £ (a 3, ag). W hen c <  2 , the right 
hand side is higher than one: when a  £ ( a 3 , 1 ], Q  first increases and then 
decreases with n.
Social welfare increases with n if and only if:
a(cn  +  2)[2n2 -  (2 +  c)n — 2] <  (1 — c*)c2(3 +  c)(n -  l)[n 2 +  (2 +  c)n -  1]] (39)
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or:
[3c +  c? — a(2 +  3c +  c2 ))]cn3 
+  [c2(3 +  4 c +  c2) — a(4  — 2c +  c2(2 +  4c +  c2 )]n2 
+  [a(4 +  4c +  c2(3 +  c)2) — c2(3 +  c)2]n 
+ c2(3 +  c) +  a[4 -  c2(3 +  c)] >  0
Social welfare depends on the three effects which may dom inate alterna­
tively and may take various shapes. However, when a  is low enough, S W  
always increases with n. W hen a  is large enough, S W  either decreases or first 
increases and then decreases with the number of downstream firms. □
P r o o f  o f  L e m m a  3:
Once she bargained and she supplied the non integrated firms, the supplier
supplies her downstream firm the quantity qi satisfying:
max(ue -  q - i  -  -  c(2<?_i +  q i )q i /2  (40)
that is qi =  [ve — (1 +  c)q_ i]/(2  +  c). Therefore, the supplier’s and down­
stream firm s’ offers respectively satisfy:
-  vs* -
i= 2
+ L  \v e ~
=2
n
[L ?s.* ' +
ve  -  ( 1  +  c) E "=2 qs,i-\ve -  ( 1  +  c) £ ’*=2 1s,i
i-
■cl
2  +  c J 2  +  c
u e - ( l  +  c ) ( $  ,_1 +  qs,i)
<ls-i - i  -  q s ,i------------------ — -----------------Z -j- c
v e  — (1  +  c ) £ - L 2 ?5,."|2
/2
*=2 2 +  c
whose unique solutions are qs,i =  0, Vz G {2, ...,n}  and:
<7*
(41)
m a x 9 , , s , T t ) S  [ve -  qitS ~
v e -  ( 1  +  c)(g“ , ._1 + g j,5 )i 
2  +  c qi,s — Ti,s
(42)
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s .t . Tits + T-{~i + v e ~  <I-i-1 — 
ve -  ( 1  +  c)(g“ i _ 1 +  ^ ,5)i ve -  ( 1  +  c ) ( ^ _ i + ^ s )
2  +  c
—cf e ,5 +  q - i -1 +
2  +  c
ve -  (1 +  +  q%,s) v
2 +  c J
72
>  7’“<_ li„ =„ +  [(®e -  9 - <) 9 - 4 =0 -  “ 7-,,,.=  02/2  
The constraint is binding, so th a t the solutions of this programs satisfy:
max9t S [ ( 1  +  c)ve -  qiyS ~  q% - i][ve -  ( 1  +  c)qa_{_ x +  qiiS\
—c[qi,s +  q - i - 1 +  ve]2/ 2  (43)
whose unique solutions are qi:s  =  0,Vz G {2, ...,n} . □
P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s i t io n  2:
First consider e as given. There is vertical integration when:
  JJnt _
2 2 v e « (cn +  2 ) +  ( 1  -  «)c(n -  1 )
2 ( 2  +  c) 2 [ ( 1  +  c)n + 1 ] 2 -   ^ ;
whose derivative is:
rTTvi T T n i y  (1 +  c)(2 +  c)« -  c(3 +  c)]n -  [(2 +  c )a  -  c] 2 2 
[U ~ U  1 = --------------------2 [ ( 1  +  c)n  +  l ]3-------------------- ’  6  (45)
Thus, when a  >  c(3 +  c ) /( l  + c)(2  +  c), the derivative is positive Vn >  1 : the 
incentive to vertically integrate increases with n when v2e2 / 2 ( 2  +  c )(l +  c) 2 < 
+  <  v2e2(l — a ) l ( 2 +  c). W hen a  <  c(3 +  c ) /( l  +  c)(2 +  c), the incentive to 
integrate either first increases and then decreases or decreases. There exists 
£ [c(3 +  c ) /( l  +  c)(2 +  c), 1] such tha t the incentive to integrate decreases 
with n for all a  > a 2 when v2e2 / 2 ( 2  +  c)(l +  c) 2 > +  > v2e2(l — a ) / ( 2  +  c).
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Taking the supplier’s investment into account, it is easy to see tha t since 
U =  e3 / 6  in all cases, the analysis above is not affected when integration and 
non-integration lead to different investment levels. □
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Chapter 4
Dynamic Adverse Selection 
and Debt
(joint work with Dr. Antoine Faure-Grim aud, LSE)
A b strac t
This chapter argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revela­
tion of information in dynamic adverse selection problems. We analyse 
the financing decision of a monopolist facing a buyer whose valuation 
is private information. A high level of (renegotiable) debt, by increas­
ing the scope for liquidation, may induce the high valuation buyer to 
buy early at a high price and thus increase the monopolist’s expected 
payoff. By affecting the buyer’s strategy, it may reduce the probability 
of excessive liquidation. We compare the monopolist’s payoff and debt 
levels under production to order and under production to market and 
we investigate the effects of asset and good durability.
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1 In tro d u ctio n
This chapter analyses the financing decision of a monopolist selling a good to 
a buyer with private information about his valuation. We argue th a t when the 
relationship is a long term  one, tha t is when the monopolist can charge a price 
to the buyer at least twice, the strategic use of debt favours the elicitation 
of information from the buyer. Even renegotiable, debt may give room for 
inefficient liquidation. The possibility of liquidation lowers a buyer’s expected 
rent of mimicking a lower valuation buyer. Thus, the monopolist can charge 
higher prices at an early stage. The strategic use of debt increases the value 
of the monopolist. We investigate the effect of good and asset durability.
Crucial features of dynamic adverse selection problems are th a t the buyer’s 
early decision reveals information about his type and tha t the monopolist (or 
principal) can use information strategically when deciding on her subsequent 
contract offers. Hence, it is costly for the buyer to reveal information and 
the monopolist’s contract offers are subject to the constraint tha t the buyer’s 
expected rents from not revealing information are lower than the utility  from 
revealing it at an early stage. We point out tha t the strategic use of debt 
may relax this constraint: since debt leaves scope for liquidation, the buyer’s 
expected rent from not revealing information is lower. More precisely, not 
revealing information may itself lead to cash constrained and thus inefficient 
debt renegotiation ending up in (partial) liquidation while revealing informa­
tion gives the monopolist enough cash to make inefficient liquidation impossi­
ble. Using debt as a mechanism to elicit information enables the monopolist 
to extract a higher share of the expected surplus she generates and thus to 
increase her profit. A high level of debt may also reduce the probability of 
inefficient liquidation and decreases social surplus.
The two basic problems of dynamic adverse selection are the Coasian dy­
namics faced by a durable good monopolist and the ratchet effect in long term 
relationships between a monopolist and a buyer with private information. We
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first investigate the Coasian idea tha t the m onopolist’s profit is constrained 
by the buyer’s expectation tha t the price will decrease over tim e. The usual 
Coasian intuition is tha t the durable good monopolist competes with herself 
over time. W hen the monopolist can charge different consecutive prices, follow­
ing the rejection of a price, she updates her beliefs about the buyer’s valuation 
and decreases her price over time. Anticipating this, the buyer with a high 
valuation may be better off waiting for a decrease in the price before buying. 
However, a buyer with a high valuation may choose to buy early when the 
monopolist may be (partly) liquidated before the price decreases. Hence, the 
monopolist may wish to choose a high level of debt to commit to this ex post 
inefficient behaviour.
The durable good case makes the m onopolist’s com petition with herself 
over time extreme. However, when the good is not durable and buyers are 
not anonymous, the monopolist’s profit is still constrained by the well-known 
ratchet effect. The intuition behind this effect is tha t a high valuation buyer 
who buys a good at a high price at an early stage leads the monopolist to 
charge a high price in next stages, which lowers the buyer’s future rent. Hence, 
a high valuation buyer may be reluctant to buy the good at a high price at an 
early stage. He may first want to mimick a lower valuation buyer to increase 
his future rent. Since debt comes together with a possibility of liquidation, it 
still lowers the expected rent of mimicking a lower type buyer. However, the 
benefit from debt is smaller than in the durable good case1.
The analysis suggests a number of extensions. First, our argum ent holds 
when liquidation affects the quantity to be sold in the future. In a two-stage 
model, the monopolist produces to order or adopts just in tim e m anufactur­
ing. If there is production to market, the quantity offered will be available 
at any time after it is available on the m arket. Thus, partial liquidation will
1When the good is not durable and buyers are anonymous, there is no dynamic adverse 
selection. The monopolist does not compete with himself over time and debt loses its positive 
value.
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not restrict the quantity offered at the next stage and the traditional Coasian 
dynamics appear. Hence, in the separating equilibrium, the m onopolist’s pay­
off and debt are higher under production to order than under production to 
market.
Second, for a given financial constraint, the m onopolist’s payoff decreases 
with the durability of the asset. The more durable the asset, the higher the 
sum that the monopolist can commit to pay later to the creditor and the lower 
the scope for early liquidation. However, our results prove to be very robust 
to a change in asset durability.
Third, the benefit of the strategic use of debt to the monopolist increases 
with the durability of the good. The more durable the good, the higher the 
possible increase in price in the first stage and the lower the profit to be made 
in the second stage2. This suggests tha t ceteris paribus debt should increase 
with the durability of the good.
The idea tha t debt may increase the expected profit of a monopolist selling 
a durable good is to be contrasted with Titm an (1984). T itm an argues that 
when the buyers’ valuation depends on after-sale services, debt decreases the 
value of durable good monopolists: the higher the debt level, the higher the 
probability of bankruptcy and the lower the possibility of being able to grant 
after-sale services. In T itm an, the buyers’ valuation depends on the existence 
of the firm after the good is bought. Here, we abstract from after-sale services. 
So the buyer’s valuation is independent of the fate of the firm after the good 
is bought. Debt induces the buyer to purchase earlier at a higher price and 
allows the monopolist to appropriate a higher share of the surplus.
Section 2 describes the strategic use of an optim al debt contract in Coasian 
dynamics and provides a number of extensions and applications such as the 
effects of money diversion and cost padding, the tim ing of production and
2In contrast, if the creditor has some bargaining power with the monopolist, the sum  
that the monopolist can commit to pay to the creditor during the renegotiation and the debt 
capacity decrease with the durability of the good.
109
asset and good durability. In section 3, we address the ratchet effect with 
menu offers and the possibility for the buyer to quit the relationship. We also 
briefly discuss how the buyer’s capital structure affects the m onopolist’s pricing 
strategy. Section 4 concludes.
2 C oasian  D yn am ics and  T h e  O p tim a l D eb t  
C ontract
In this section, we first address the financing decision of a durable good mo­
nopolist. We then give a number of comparative statics results. We focus on 
debt renegotiation and describe an “ideal” property of an optim al debt con­
tract. Debt forces a high valuation buyer to pay the static monopoly price 
at the beginning of the game. In addition, there is no scope for inefficient  
liquidation after the sale takes place. The debt level is chosen to ensure that 
no sale triggers default. This leads to cash constrained (and thus inefficient) 
debt renegotiation and total liquidation of the firm.
2.1 The M odel
The product market follows Hart and Tirole (1988). The financial side borrows 
from Hart and Moore (1989) and Hart (1995)3.
2 .1 .1  T h e  p r o d u c t  m a r k e t
A monopolist M  has the capacity to produce q G {0,1} units of a durable 
good to be sold in stage 1 or 2 to a single buyer. The production cost is 0. 
A durable good is defined such tha t when the sale takes place in stage 1 , the 
buyer consumes the good in both stages 1 and 2 .
3A Bolton-Scharfstein debt contract would also capture our point. In Bolton and Scharf- 
stein (1996), there is no temporal correlation between the payoffs to the m onopolist. In their 
setup, this implies that the optimal financial contract is less “tough” than a standard debt 
contract. In a product market characterized by dynamic adverse selection, the monopolist 
competes with herself over time. This implies that the optimal Bolton-Scharfstein financial 
contract is a standard debt contract where there is liquidation with probability 1 (resp. 0) 
if low (resp. high) profits are reported by the monopolist.
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The buyer has private information about his valuation v 6  {V /,\4}, with 
Vh >  Vi- Initially, it is common knowledge th a t v =  1 4  (type h ) with prob­
ability Xi and v — Vi (type /) with probability 1 — Ai. We make the usual 
assumption tha t, in a static framework without financial constraints the mo­
nopolist would prefer selling the good at p\  =  1 4  with probability Ai to selling 
it for sure at price p\ =  VJ, Le. Ai > Ai =  Vi/Vh• Let q\ be the am ount that 
the buyer of type i € {/, h}  buys in stage t.
2 .1 .2  T h e  f in a n c ia l c o n tr a c t
The monopolist has an initial wealth of w  and needs capital K  >  w  to buy an 
asset necessary to enter the product market. K  only needs to be paid once in 
stage 1 . The firm can be liquidated (and the asset sold), generating a return 
L t at the end of stage t whether the good was produced and sold or not. The 
asset depreciates. In particular, K  >  L\  >  5L 2, where S is the discount factor 
common to all agents. The liquidation decision can be made either by the 
monopolist or by the creditor. Entering the product m arket is profitable. We 
assume L\  <  S(Vi 4 - L 2), i.e. liquidating the asset at the end of stage 1 is 
inefficient if the good is not sold. Except when specified and without loss of 
generality, we shall assume L 2 =  0.
Following Hart and Moore (1989, 1996) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), 
we assume th a t the monopolist can divert cash flows more easily than physical 
assets. Formally, returns from liquidation are verifiable while profits from the 
sale of the good are not (they can be used for perks) 4.
We now turn  to the set of financial contracts. The monopolist can borrow 
an am ount B  >  K  — w  from a creditor against the pledge to repay R i  and R 2 
at the end of stages 1 and 2 whenever possible. As profits are non-verifiable, 
feasible contracts can only specify tha t the firm repays the promised amount
4In other words, the monopolist cannot be convicted of stealing the operational profit. 
One reason for this is that there is a probability that this profit is null.
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or the creditor has the right to liquidate (part of) the asset. Let f t denote the 
fraction of the asset remaining at date t (with / 0 =  1 ).
In the final stage, the creditor can obtain nothing from the operational profit 
as the monopolist will always divert it. However, before this, the monopolist 
may be prepared to give up some of the operational profit to the creditor 
to avoid liquidation. Before liquidation takes place, the stream  of promised 
repayments can be renegotiated5. We point out tha t the renegotiation outcome 
may be constrained by the m onopolist’s financial constraint. Renegotiation 
is not fully efficient because product m arket returns are non verifiable. For 
simplicity, we also assume that the monopolist has all bargaining power in case 
of renegotiation in stage 1 and tha t the creditor cannot seize the m onopolist’s 
savings (tha t is, in stage 1 , B  — ( K  — w)) .
W ithout loss of generality, we assume tha t the m arket for creditors is per­
fectly competitive and tha t before borrowing, the monopolist can invest wq <  w  
in a two period project with a zero rate of non verifiable return so tha t she 
invests only w p =  w  — w 0 in the project described above6. All parties are 
risk-neutral.
2 .1 .3  D e f in it io n  o f  t h e  e q u ilib r iu m
The sequence of events is as follows:
• In stage 1, the monopolist chooses w p and wo and borrows an amount B  
from the creditor against the pledge to repay {R t}. M  charges a price p i . 
The buyer decides whether to buy or not. Accordingly, M  produces and 
sells the quantity ordered and decides whether to sell the asset or not. 
Renegotiation may take place and M  satisfies her financial obligations.
5This is a central feature of our model: introducing a commitment possibility with a 
third party would allow the monopolist to commit to a price and, of course, would solve 
the coasian dynamics. However, such an agreement is not renegotiation-proof because the 
monopolist could always bribe the third party ex post to lower the price.
6The money can be secretly invested in a tax haven and to bring it back would disclose 
tax evasion and lead the monopolist to jail or to pay a heavy penalty. In this case, w p would 
be the publicly known initial wealth of the monopolist.
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• In stage 2, if the monopolist carries on (i.e. /  >  0), she chooses a price 
p2. The buyer chooses to buy or not to buy. M  sells the asset and repays 
the creditor.
For a given financial contract, a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium  in the product 
m arket is defined by:
i) a sequence of prices {P 1 1 P2 }  characterizing the m onopolist’s strategy,
occurs only if prior offers have been rejected). At this price, M  is able to 
supply either a quantity f t or 0  at stage t.
because, from the creditor’s perspective, the m arket equilibrium is irrelevant 
since returns are non-verifiable: his strategy depends only on the liquidation 
values.
2.2 Coasian D ynam ics and Financial C onstraints
We proceed by backward induction. The strategy of a buyer of type i in stage
conditional upon her beliefs regarding the buyer’s type (an offer at date t
ii) a sequence of buyer’s decisions to order the quantity qt G {0 , f t }  at date 
t. The buyer buys the good supplied at price p t with probability x \ (p t) and 
buys nothing with probability 1 — x\ (p t).
iii) a probability distribution defining the m onopolist’s beliefs derived from 
equilibrium strategies using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
Our equilibrium definition does not involve the creditor’s strategy. This is
2  is:
1 i f  p 2 <  Vi 
0  o th e rw is e ( i )
Let A2 {jp\ ) be the probability tha t i =  h knowing tha t p\  was rejected. The 
monopolist plays:
P2 =
Vk i f  A214 >  Vi
Vi o th e rw is e (2)
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Since the monopolist has all the bargaining power with the creditor in the 
renegotiation game at the end of stage 1 , the creditor cannot be repaid more 
than L\.  Thus, w p must satisfy w v >  K  — Li  so tha t the monopolist gets her 
initial investment back. Indeed, the creditor will get D\  =  m in{ith ,L i} and 
D 2 =  0. Given th a t the market for creditors is perfectly competitive, D\  =  B .  
Therefore:
K  — w p <  B  =  Di  <  L\  (3)
Two cases arise:
• if the buyer bought in stage 1 , M  closes the firm and sells the assets. 
The creditor is repaid D \ 7.
• if the buyer did not buy in stage 1 , then the continuation value is at least 
SVi >  L\ .  When the creditor liquidates a fraction 1 — /  of the assets 
in stage 1 , the monopolist loses at least ( 1  — f )(SV[  — L\) .  Thus, the 
monopolist will prefer to pay back in cash first and liquidate as little  as 
possible. Since B  =  D i ,  B  — ( K  — w v) <  Th, the monopolist will not be 
able to pay all of D\  in cash. She will pay as much as she can in cash, 
but will have to accept the liquidation of a fraction 1 — /  of the assets 
such th a t B  — ( K  — w p) +  (1 — f ) L \  =  D\\
/  = (4)
Note tha t forgiving some of the debt today or contracting a new loan to 
partly repay the debt against a reimbursement in t =  2  is impossible: as L 2 =  0 , 
D 2 is null8.
7The proceeds of a liquidation triggered by the monopolist are verifiable.
8One may think that following a liquidation M  could decide to buy a new asset to replace 
the initial investment of K .  The cost of such a policy is K .  It seems natural to assume that 
the depreciation process is identical to the one which occurred during the first period. Hence, 
the liquidation value of an asset bought at the beginning of the second period is also L \  at 
the end of t  =  2. But the difference is that now M  has no more cash w p to invest in the 
project. As K  >  L \  such a solution is not feasible.
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In stage 1, buyers’ strategies can be characterized as follows. The buyer of 
type I cannot expect any surplus if he waits. His strategy in stage 1 is:
J ( n d \ _ /  * * / Pi — ^ ( 1  +  
i( ^  |  0  o th e rw ise
Indeed, if pi =  V/(l +  <£), then the buyer accepts with probability 1 whatever 
his type. Consider now p\ >  V/(l -\-S). A type h buyer is willing to buy at t  =  1 
if and only if he gets at least what he would obtain by deferring his purchase. If 
he expects a fraction 1 — /  of the asset to be liquidated in case he does not buy, 
then he buys with probability 1 up to pi satisfying 1 4 ( 1  +  J) —p\  >  Sf(Vh — P2 )- 
Since a buyer of type h buys with probability 1 at p\  and a buyer of type I 
does not buy, the ex post beliefs of the monopolist are such th a t A2 =  0 , i.e. 
the equilibrium is fully separating. Hence, P2 =  Vi and:
Pi =  Vh( l + 6 ) - 8 f ( V h - V l) (6 )
Let us now consider the case where the monopolist charges pi >  p\ .  In 
this case, the buyer of type h may play a mixed strategy9. He accepts pi with 
probability x  making the monopolist indifferent between P2 =  14 and P 2 =  Id10- 
We thus get:
2 A ^ l - *) +  ( ! - A,) Vh 1 ( )
The only possible equilibrium strategy for the buyer is to set x \ (pi) =  x for 
all pi E (pi, 14(1+^)] and for all R\ .  In equilibrium, the buyer of type h m ust be 
indifferent between accepting and rejecting. Let <j2 =  P r o b { p 2 =  V/}. Hence, 
a 2 =  V5f {^  . If the buyer did not buy, then, for any pi 6  (pi, 14(1 +  ^)], the 
m onopolist’s expected payoff at stage 2  is 6 [a2Vi +  ( 1  — <t2 )A14] =  SVi- Thus, 
her semi-separating payoff is maximised for pi =  1 4 ( 1  +  <£).
9To accept with probability 1 is not an equilibrium as it would lead to a fully revealing 
rejection (A2 =  0) implying that the buyer of type h should wait.
10If p 2 =  V[ with probability 1, then if pi <  pi we go back to the previous case. If pi >  p i, 
type h waits and we get a pooling equilibrium with no buying at t  =  1. But this last strategy 
is always suboptimal from the monopolist perspective. Last, it is not possible for the buyer 
with a high valuation to be indifferent in t =  1 if p2 =  14 with probability 1.
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Therefore, the pooling, separating and semi-separating expected utilities to 
the monopolist are:
Up =  Vl{ l + 5 )  +  L 1 - { K - w )  (8 )
U. =  i/.M  +  A,[vk(l +  5(1— /,■)) + £ , ■ - ( i f +  (9)
Uss =  —— ^-[14(1 +  $) — ( K  — w PiSS) -T L\\
+  SfssVl +  W0jSS (1 0 )
where subscripts p, s and ss  hold for pooling, separating and semi-separating, 
respectively. For a given financial contract, depending on Ai, the m onopolist’s 
equilibrium strategy is to choose p\  leading to either the separating or the semi- 
separating outcome. Clearly, the financial contract chosen by the monopolist 
depends on the anticipated equilibrium in the product market.
Us decreases with f s and since f 8 =  1 — K ~^p,s, it increases w ith K  and 
K  — w PjS and decreases with w PiS. Since w o tS =  w  — w PiS can be stuck in a 
two period project with a zero rate of non verifiable return, the monopolist 
can endogeneize f a =  1 — (K  — (w  — w 0,s) ) / L i  and w 0,s is chosen so as to 
make f s =  0. Thus, when the monopolist expects a separating equilibrium in 
the product market, she makes sure tha t there is complete liquidation if the 
buyer does not buy in stage 1 . In this separating equilibrium , the expectation of 
liquidation induces the buyer to buy which makes complete liquidation optim al 
ex post11.
In contrast, the semi-separating utility is increasing in f ss and w PiSS and 
decreasing in K .  A decrease in f ss reduces the stage 2 profit if the buyer did 
not buy in stage 1. But it can neither lead to an increase in p\  nor affect 
the probability tha t the buyer will buy in stage 1. Thus, when she expects a 
semi-separating equilibrium in the product m arket, the monopolist invests all
n This point is similar to Fudenberg et al (1987) where a fixed cost of continuation corre­
sponds here to a decrease in the liquidation value.
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her wealth in the durable good project so as to minimize f ss. We thus obtain 
the following results:
L e m m a  1 : Assume that a given w v is invested in the durable good project.  
There exists a threshold A =  A(wp, K ) such that the equilibrium in the product  
market  is semi-separat ing when Ai >  A and separat ing when Ai <  A. A is 
positive, decreases with w p, increases with K  and equals 1  when K  — w p =  L\ ,  
i.e. when the total ity o f  the assets is liquidated in case o f  default.
. X[Vk( l  + 8 ) -  SfV,  - ( K -  wr) +  In]
A 14(1 +  S) +  S f ( (  1 -  A)14 -  V,) +  A(L, - ( K -  «;„))  ^ ’
Hence, for a given financial contract, a sufficiently high fraction of the assets 
liquidated in case of default may ensure tha t a semi-separating equilibrium  in 
the traditional Coasian dynamics case without debt is replaced by a unique 
fully separating equilibrium.
P r o p o s i t io n  1 ; For all Ai, the monopolis t  invests w p =  K  — L\  in the durable 
good project  and borrows B  =  L\ =  K —w p (borrowing capacity).  Hence, default 
triggers her complete liquidation. The only equilibrium in the product  market  
is a fully separating one with a stage 1 price p\ =  1 4 ( 1  -f <£).
P r o o f:  See Appendix.
The monopolist chooses the fraction to be liquidated in case of default so 
as to obtain a fully separating equilibrium in the product m arket. Investing 
w 0 =  w — ( K  — Li) in the alternative project commits the monopolist to be 
completely liquidated if the high valuation buyer does not buy. This forces 
the high valuation buyer to purchase with probability 1 for prices up to his 
valuation in stage 1 . This commitment arises from the financial constraint 
that she needs to borrow up to her borrowing capacity. Debt restores full 
static monopoly power.
Note th a t if the equilibrium is semi-separating w ithout money diversion, 
then some inefficient liquidation occurs with probability ( 1  — Ai)/(1 — A). Be­
ing financially constrained allows the monopolist to switch to a separating
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equilibrium which implies th a t inefficient liquidation only occurs with proba­
bility 1 — Ai. Thus, a harder financial constraint and a higher level of debt 
may decrease the probability of inefficient liquidation.
In addition, in the traditional Coasian dynamics without debt, the low 
valuation buyer purchases the good when the price goes down. In contrast, the 
strategic use of debt makes sure th a t the good is produced and sold to the high 
valuation buyer only, i.e. with probability Ai only. The price is always too high 
for the low valuation buyer to buy the good. Hence, the strategic use of debt 
decreases social surplus. This is natural since debt enables the monopolist to 
restore her static monopoly power.
2.3 E xtensions and A pplications
2.3.1 C o st P a d d in g  a n d  M o n ey  D iv e rs io n
We have seen tha t the binding financial constraint, L\ =  K  — w p, can be 
obtained by investing in another two period project. Alternatively, the mo­
nopolist could make sure tha t the liquidation value L\  is low enough, i.e. tha t 
the asset depreciates fast enough. For this, she could initially spend her re­
sources in perks rather than in acquiring skills or m aterial to m aintain the asset 
to a good second-hand value. Cost padding with no “shadow cost” , where the 
manager can appropriate every unit of an increase in AT, is also similar to in­
vesting in the alternative project. The monopolist could increase K  and spend 
the additional cost in perks.
C o ro lla ry  1  ; Cost  padding up to K  =  w-\-L\  is opt imal  and leads to a unique 
separating equilibrium with p\ — 1 4 ( 1  +  ^).
The results above are very clear-cut because they assume th a t the monopo­
list can fully use the resources she diverts. It may be the case, though, tha t she 
can only partly  benefit from the resources she diverts. Our results are reason­
ably robust to this assumption. As a benchmark case, we tu rn  to a monopolist
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who cannot enjoy anything from the diverted resources.
P r o p o s i t io n  2  : Assum e that the monopolis t  cannot use the resources she 
d iver t s . Then, there exist \ a and  A b, with A & > Aa fo r  some parameter  values, 
siuch that when Ai E [Aa,A&], the monopolist  initially burns w  — ( K  — L\) ,  
borrows B  =  L\  (debt capacity) and charges a fully separating price pi  .=.
Vh(l + 6).
P ro o f: See Appendix.
The strategic use of debt in promoting information revelation arises from 
the  feature th a t no sale triggers complete liquidation. This occurs if no money 
is left to renegotiate at the end of stage 1 . W hen the only possibility is to 
burn the money taken away from the project, restoring the static  monopoly 
power entails an additional cost. The range of Ai such tha t the equilibrium 
is separating is reduced by the m onopolist’s inability to benefit from money 
diversion.
When Ai is large (when the incentive to discriminate is high), the utility 
in the separating equilibrium decreases with w p. She is willing to burn money 
as it allows her to restore her monopoly power. Nonetheless, she only does 
so if her utility after burning money is higher than what she would obtain 
in another equilibrium. This condition is m et when Ai is not too large. By 
burning money, the monopolist can endogeneize /  because it reduces her initial 
wealth.
If money burning is impossible and Ax E [Aa,A&], then a high cost to un­
dertake the project and /or a low initial wealth (respectively up and down to 
K  =  w-\- L \ )  are utility increasing. The higher K  and the lower iw, the greater 
the scope for liquidation if the buyer of type h does not buy in stage 1 and the 
higher his willingness to buy in stage 1 . A high cost reduces the profitability 
of the project, but increases the m onopolist’s expected payoff.
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2 .3 .2  F in a n c ia l  C o n s tr a in ts  a n d  P r o d u c t io n  t o  O r d e r  v e r s u s  P r o ­
d u c t io n  t o  M a r k e t
A key assumption driving our results in Section 2.2 is th a t the monopolist 
produces after the buyer decided to buy, i.e. she produces to order. If she 
produced to m arket (before the buyer decision is m ade), debt could not con­
strain her capacity to supply the good: even if the firm was totally liquidated, 
the good would still be available to the buyer and the th reat of liquidation 
would not affect the buyer’s decision (unless the monopolist owns the delivery 
technology). Thus, we have:
C o r o lla r y  2 : Retaining the assumptions of  Proposi t ion 1 or  2 under which 
the equilibrium in the product market is separating, under production to order, 
the monopoli s t ’s utility and debt are higher than under production to market.
However, in the semi-separating equilibrium, liquidation does not affect the 
buyer’s probability of ordering the good in stage 1. Producing to m arket in 
stage 1 allows the monopolist to produce 1 unit before being at least partly 
liquidated. This increases her stage 2 expected profit. Thus, in the semi- 
separating equilibrium, production to market dominates production to order.
2 .3 .3  W h e n  t h e  A s s e t  is  D u r a b le
We have discussed comparative statics with respect to L\ .  We now consider 
1/2 > 0 and focus on the effect of L<i on our previous results. A strictly positive 
liquidation value at t  =  2  allows the monopolist to promise to repay up to 
f 'L /2 to the creditor. The actual repayments are D 2 =  min{i?2 , f ' ^ 2 ]  and 
Di =  min{i?i, L\ — The debt value is B  =  D \ + 8 D 2 - Clearly, a change
in L2 does not affect the stage 2  equilibrium strategies on the product market.
We turn to its effect on / ' .  If the buyer bought one unit in stage 1, it is 
optimal to sell the asset at the end of stage 1 , i.e. / '  =  0. Indeed, M  has
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p l 4 - B  — (K  — w p) +  (1 — f ' ) L i  +  8 f ,L 2 whose m aximum is attained  for f  =  0. 
Therefore, she repays D \  +  8 D 2 =  D \  — min{/th, L \ ) .
If the sale did not take place in stage 1, the monopolist still prefers not 
to sell the assets. Note tha t whatever the financial contract and whatever its 
term , it is always optim al to have R 2 =  f ' L 2 (i.e to promise as much as possible 
in t  — 2). To see this, assume R 2 <  f  L 2. Then, it is possible to propose dD  1 
and d D 2 such th a t the payoff of the creditor is unchanged: —d D \  +  5 d D 2 =  0. 
As R 2 <  f ' L 2, d D 2 =  d R 2. Some debt is forgiven (in a long term  financial 
contract) or a new loan is contracted to reduce R\  (as for a sequence of short 
term  debts). Yet, as D\  decreases, M  can save a greater fraction of the asset. 
This increases her expected utility by at least d[8 (Vi +  L 2) — L\] >  0. Hence, 
we restrict ourselves to contracts with D 2 =  f ' L 2. However, liquidation will 
still occur at the end of period 1 if B  — ( K  — w p) +  (1 — f ) L \  <  D \ .  But 
B  — Di  +  8 f  L 2 and the fraction of the asset eventually liquidated is such 
that:
r, • n  L i - ( I < - w p)
f  = m i n {  1 , ----  _   } (1 2 )
If SL 2 >  K  — w p, then liquidation never occurs and we are back to the 
unlevered case, f  is higher than /  for given K , L i , w p: the higher L2, the 
more repayment the monopolist can postpone to the end of stage 2  and the 
less liquidation occurs12.
L e m m a  2 : For a given w p, the separat ing (resp semi-separat ing)  equilibrium 
will yield a lower (resp higher) payof f  to the monopolist  the more durable the 
asset.
To obtain f  =  0 still requires w p =  K  — L\ .  The m onopolist’s utilities 
under the three different possible equilibria are still given by (8 ), (9) and (10) 
(with / '  instead of / ) .  Therefore, it is easy to check that:
12 As before, there is no need to consider the case where the monopolist buys a new fraction 
of the asset at the end of stage 1.
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P r o p o s i t io n  3 : If  the monopolis t  can divert resources to her  own benefit 
ex ante, Z/2 >  0 does not  affect Proposit ion 1. If  she cannot, the results of  
Proposi tion 2  still  hold with A^  <  Aa and X'b <  Xf, decreasing with L 2 ■
P r o o f:  See Appendix.
The borrowing limit remains at L\  whatever L2 <  L \ /S .  The monopolist 
will borrow the same amount as before to secure the separating equilibrium. 
A higher L2 allows the monopolist to postpone some of its repaym ent and 
increases /  (M  keeps a larger share of the asset) for a given w p. Diverting (or 
burning) one unit of cash entails a lower increase in 1 — /  the higher L 2. In a 
semi-separating equilibrium, there is no room for a strategic use of debt and the 
monopolist is better off with /  as high as possible. Therefore, the durability 
of the asset favours this type of equilibrium relative to the separating one.
2 .3 .4  D e b t  a n d  t h e  D u r a b il i ty  o f  t h e  G o o d
Assume tha t, with probability a , a buyer ordering the good at stage 1 can 
still consume it at stage 2. W ith probability 1 — a , he cannot consume it any 
more. In this case, he can buy another good at stage 2, given his first period 
decision gave information to the monopolist about his type. We refer to a  as 
the durability of the good. W hether the good is durable or not is revealed at 
the beginning of stage 2 .
Clearly, the final stage strategies in the product m arket are as in the durable 
good case. /  is also determined as before. Proceeding as in section 3, we obtain:
P! =  14(1 + a 5 ) - 5 f ( V h - V l) (13)
Up =  (1 +  8 a)Vi +  m ax{L i,£ (l — a)XiVh}  — ( K  — w)  (14)
Us =  Ai[14(l +  a 6 ) +  m ax{Li, ( 1  — a)SVh} — L\]
-  ( I < - w )  +  L x (15)
uss =  y -  ^  [14(1 +  aS)  +  m ax{Li, (1  -  a ) 6 Vh} -  ( K  -  u?)]
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+  -  ( K  -  w ) } / L ,  (16)
Us - U ss =  i— ^-[V)(l -  <* +  a<5) +  A m ax {I1, ( 1  -  a)5Vh}}
1 — A
+  ( l - A 1)Li +  ^ j ( A ' - t « ) ^ V 5 / L 1 - l )  (17)
It is still true tha t Us >  Up and tha t Us — Uss is positive and increases with 
a.  We thus obtain:
P r o p o s it io n  4  : There is a unique fully separat ing equilibrium with w v,s — 
K  — L\  and maximum indebtness. The increase in the monopol is t ’s util ity due 
to this strategic use of  debt increases with the durability of  the good.
In other words, the benefit from being financially constrained increases 
with the durability. It is natural tha t the advantage of debt increases with the 
durability of the good since the less durable the good, the less competition the 
monopolist faces with herself over time.
The special case a  =  0 refers either to the sale of a non durable good or to 
the rental of a durable good. In this case, it is well known that the supplier faces 
a ratchet effect: the type h buyer anticipates th a t the monopolist is going use 
her updated information in stage 2 , which will lower the future buyer’s utility 
if he reports the tru th  in stage 1 . Hence, mimicking the type I buyer in stage 
1 may be profitable in stage 2 , which sets an upper constraint to the stage 1 
price charged by the monopolist. In this case again, the threat of bankruptcy 
if the buyer does not purchase allows the monopolist to charge the same price 
as in the static case.
In a richer setup, the higher benefit from using debt associated with a more 
durable good may have to be balanced with a lower debt capacity. If the 
creditor had some bargaining power, the debt capacity (and, for a given iup, 
1 — / )  would decrease with the durability of the good. Indeed, when the good 
is more durable, the expected profit at stage 2  is higher and the monopolist is 
ready to pay more to keep a high fraction of the asset. Hence, a more durable
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good implies a higher incentive to be financially constrained but a lower debt 
capacity.
3 R a tch e t E ffect w ith  M en u  Offers and  D e b t
In this section, we consider a non durable good monopolist facing the same 
dem and at each date. We allow the monopolist to make menu offers stipulat­
ing a quantity and a tariff corresponding to a particular quantity. Typically, 
in a dynamic setting, the ratchet effect limits the ability of the monopolist 
to discriminate between types: the buyer compares his future rent when he 
misreports his type today with what he will obtain when reporting his true 
valuation. As there exists a positive rent differential, information revelation is 
more difficult than  in the static case (although the problem is not as severe as 
in Coasian Dynamics).
In this new setting, there is still room for a strategic use of debt: the pos­
sibility of bankruptcy reduces the high valuation buyer’s incentive to mimick 
the low valuation one. The rent differential decreases with the probability of 
liquidation. Second, it is shown that the positive effect of debt on information 
revelation pertains even though the buyer is not pivotal. So far, the incentives 
for a high valuation buyer to buy early were maximized: no sale at t  =  1 
triggered complete liquidation of the monopolist. Here, instead of focusing on 
renegotiation issues between the monopolist and the creditor, we assume th a t 
the former can be liquidated independently of the buyer’s decision.
In a two stage case, the seminal paper by Laffont and Tirole (1988) shows 
that screening amongst agents is impossible when the private information pa­
ram eter is a continuous variable. This negative result comes from an “extrem e” 
version of the ratchet effect in the sense tha t privately informed agents are al­
lowed to quit the relationship in the second stage. The non screening result 
still holds in our model with a continuum of types. Nonetheless, debt increases 
the scope for screening and reduces the ratchet effect.
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3.1 T he Product Market
We extend the previous model to the case where the quantity is variable and 
where the monopolist may use non linear pricing rules (second degree price dis­
crimination). We adapt Laffont and Tirole’s approach to this dynamic version 
of Maskin and Riley’s (1984) model.
The good is perishable, i.e. it can be consumed for 1 stage only. A lterna­
tively, one may consider tha t the buyer can only rent the durable good. It is 
assumed th a t the buyer is not anonymous: in stage 2 , the monopolist remem­
bers the first stage offer and the buyer’s previous decision. Following Laffont 
and Tirole (1988), we assume tha t a buyer who bought at t =  1 can refuse to 
consume at t =  2  (these authors refer to this strategy as a “take the money 
and run” strategy). At each stage, the buyer’s utility is:
Ui =  etV(qt) - T u t =  1,2. (18)
with Oi £ {0 i ,6h}  and V'  > 0, V" <  0. Denote the probability Prob(0  =  Oh) =  
Ai. At each date, the monopolist offers a contract Therefore, the
product m arket of the previous section is a special case with qt £ {0 , 1 } and
Vi =  0 iV{ l ) .
For the sake of exposition, we recall the usual results in the static case. If 
Oi is perfectly observable by the monopolist, the optim al contract maximizes 
T{ — cqi, where c is the marginal cost, subject to 0{V(qi) — Tt- >  0. For each 
type, the monopolist offers the first best quantity (such th a t 0 i V ' ( q i b) =  c) and 
the buyer receives zero rent. Now, if 0{ is private information to the buyer, the 
monopolist discriminates the two types by solving:
m axg.)Tt Ai(Th -  cqh) +  ( 1  -  Ai)(7j -  cqi) 
s . t .  (I C h) 0hV (q h) - T h >  0hV ( qi) -  Tt
( IR t)  0tV(qt) - T t >  0
It is well-known tha t the optimal solution entails no distortion at the top
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and a second-best quantity for the buyer of type I (see Maskin and Riley, 1984):
=  c ( 19)
e v ' i q ? )  =  c + d i j - M V t f )  (2 0 )
where A 6  =  0 h — $i. Letting tta i  be the monopolist’s profit under asymmetric 
information13:
=  \ x(0hV { q { b) -  cq{b) -  A 1 A 9 V ( q f )  +  ( 1  -  A 1)(elV(qft ) -  c q f )  (21)
3.2 The T w o-Stage Case w ith  D ebt
We assume tha t, when the firm is indebted, there is an exogenous probabil­
ity of liquidation, 1 — / .  Once more, the analysis in the preceding section may 
justify why this probability is non null even though liquidation is inefficient.
When the monopolist cannot commit to a particular future contract, the 
stage 2 contract is the optim al one (ex post) given her beliefs. Let A£ be her 
belief that the buyer is of type h after the contract k was chosen at stage 1 . 
If A2 < 1, then the stage 2 offer is the second best static one with beliefs A^  
and the profit is t t^ A ^ )  (this holds when A§ =  0 as well). If A£ =  1, M  knows 
that the buyer has a high valuation and offers the first best quantity at a price 
6 h,V(qib)- Consequently, the high valuation buyer’s rent is null (Uh =  0).
We now turn  to stage 1. Assume, for the sake of the argum ent, th a t the 
usual second-best contract is offered in stage 1 . A type h buyer’s incentive 
constraint is binding, meaning th a t in stage 1 he is indifferent between choosing 
{ q [ b, T [ b}  and {g?6 ,T*6}. If he picks T1/ 6}, he is identified as a type h 
buyer, which implies tha t U% =  0  and tha t his intertem poral utility  equals his 
first stage utility A 0 V ( q f b). If he chooses {q f , T/*6}, he still gets a stage 1 utility 
A 0V(qfb), but since he is not identified as a type h buyer, he has a positive 
rent in stage 2  (SU% >  0). Hence, his intertem poral utility  is higher, i.e. the
13In this static case, we assume that no shutdown occurs: it is optimal to sell to the type
I buyer because neither Ai nor A0 is very high.
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usual second-best contract is no longer incentive compatible. The following 
figure illustrates the intuition.
Ti
Profit
Indiff Curves
SAU, Indiff Curve
The two points on the bold 0/j-indifTerence curve represent the static solu­
tion. For the high valuation buyer to consume the first best quantity at t =  1, 
the monopolist must lower the first stage payment by SAU-^- A U 2 represents 
the differential at t =  2  for a high valuation buyer between utility deriving from 
his choices at t =  1 ({Ti ,qfb}  or {T^, <7^}). The high valuation buyer’s rent in 
stage 2 is greater when the monopolist believes that the type is low. The third 
point is incentive compatible. Yet, for a high second stage “extra” rent, a high 
valuation buyer reveals his type only for a large decrease in t \ .  For this reason, 
a low valuation buyer may prefer to choose the allocation proposed for the high 
valuation buyer. This is possible if the low type erroneously identified as a high 
type can quit the market at t =  2 : at this date, the monopolist, believing that 
the buyer’s type is 0 ^  makes an offer that is binding out the high valuation 
buyer’s individual rationality constraint. If the low type is forced to accept
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this contract, his utility is negative and incentive com patibility at t =  1 is 
restored. Under the alternative assumption, screening the different types may 
not be possible. In particular, if 6 h — Oi is small (in the continuous case), the 
translated ^-indifference curve crosses q =  q^b below the ^/-indifference curve. 
Even in a 2 type case, different classes of equilibria may arise (according to 
which incentive constraint binds) and pooling may be the optim al strategy.
In this setting, debt alleviates the dynamic adverse selection problem. A 
type h buyer will enjoy an “extra” rent at t  =  2  with probability /  only: 
the benefit of m isreporting his type is lower since the buyer’s utility  at t =  2  
will be null with probability 1 — / 14. Graphically, the ^-indifference curve is 
translated by f d A U i f ) .
P ro p o s it io n  5 There exists 5 o ( f ) such that the equilibrium is separat ing for  
any  £ <  So( f ) and pooling otherwise,  ^o(') increases with the probabil ity of  
liquidation.
P ro o f: Appendix.
An increase in the probability of liquidation favours separating equilibria. The 
fact that the monopolist may not serve the m arket in the future decreases the 
benefit of mimicking a low valuation buyer. The strategic use of debt reduces 
the informational rent given up to the buyer. The cost of debt is th a t the 
monopolist may lose the second stage profit. W hen the discount factor is low, 
she puts more weight on the present gain than on future losses. The threshold 
increases with the probability of liquidation as more liquidation increases both 
the first stage gain and the second stage loss.
Interestingly, this effect of debt on the revelation of inform ation would 
persist if the buyer instead of the monopolis t  may liquidate. In this case, debt 
only advantages the monopolist, provided a bankrupt buyer is replaced by
14The existence of a new entrant in stage 2 would not affect our result as long as the 
monopolist’s information is not transferable.
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a new one at t  =  2  (otherwise, debt entails a cost identical to the previous 
one). An indebted buyer, who decides at t  =  1 to m isreport his type, expects 
an extra gain at t  =  2 with probability / .  This observation is particularly 
relevant in the original Laffont-Tirole setting where the “buyer” is a regulated 
firm. If this firm is indebted, the regulator may obtain information about its 
cost more easily. Debt forces the firm to adopt short term  objectives. As a 
result, problems of dynamic adverse selection are less severe. In a regulation 
framework, our conclusion would be th a t debt is welfare increasing and tha t 
the regulator would benefit from its use. This result has to be contrasted with 
Spiegel and Spulber’s (1995) paper where a regulated firm uses debt as a way of 
extorting rents from the regulator: to avoid bankruptcy, the regulator increases 
the price tha t the  regulated firm is allowed to charge. The to tal effect of debt 
may depend upon the magnitude of both effects.
4 C on clu d in g  R em arks
This paper has shown that debt can be thought of as a mechanism to elicit 
information in dynamic adverse selection problems. We believe tha t this prop­
erty is worth investigating in more sophisticated environments. For instance, 
in multi-period models, it may be interesting to analyze the possibility of ob­
taining a non monotonic sequence of prices (particularly in the durable good 
case). W hen the monopolist is financially constrained, buyers must buy at a 
high price if they want to buy the good at all. But once they have bought, 
the firm may be less financially constrained for a few periods. The price goes 
down due to the Coasian commitment problem until the firm is financially 
constrained again, which induces the monopolist to charge a high price again.
We saw how financial constraints may help alleviate the commitment prob­
lem faced by a monopolist in asymm etric information environments. We ex­
plored the idea th a t debt may allow a monopolist to capture the informational 
rents of his trading partners. It may be interesting to study further the prop­
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erties of debt in dynamic adverse selection problems and draw parallels and 
differences with the role of debt in (dynamic) moral hazard problems. Although 
the use of debt in rent extraction in static moral hazard problems is well rec­
ognized (see, amongst others, Jensen (1986) or Perotti and Spier (1993)), its 
use in dynamic agency problems has been surprisingly overlooked.
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Appendix:
P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s i t io n  1:
The monopolist allocates w  between w p and wq. The way she allocates money 
among the two projects enables her to  m anipulate the fraction of the asset she 
can keep if the buyer does not buy the good in stage 1 .
Us =  S f sVi -f Ai[14(l +  <£(1 — f s)) -f Li  — (K  — u>P)S)] +  w  — w Pis (22)
u.. =  y f y [ U ( l  +  <5) -  {K  -  +  L i ]
+  * _ X{  t fssVi  +  W -  w P'SS (23)
Us decreases with f s and Uss increases with f ss. The monopolist chooses 
between a separating equilibrium with f s =  0 (investing L\ — ( K  — w P:S) in the 
alternative project) and a semi-separating equilibrium with a f ss as high as 
possible (where w P)S =  u;, i.e. all the money is invested in entering the durable 
good m arket). The separating payoff dominates the semi-separating one if and 
only if:
\ i Vh( l  +  6 ) +  w - ( K - L i ) >  y ^ [ U ( l +  <5) +  L 1 - ( K - w ) }
+  - ( K -  w ^ S V t /L ,  (24)
which is always satisfied. In addition, it is easy to check th a t the pooling 
equilibrium is always dominated by the separating one with f s =  0 . □
P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s i t io n  2:
Assume now th a t the monopolist cannot appropriate any resources she diverts 
from the project. She cannot m anipulate /  (which is fully determined by L\
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and K  — w v) without completely wasting the resources she diverts. In this 
case, there is a tradeoff between having more money initially and making more 
profit by being financially constrained. The separating outcome with money 
burning requires that:
• The separating utility decreases with w p. This holds if and only if A i > 
SVi/[(SVh — L\) .  In this case, Us is maximised when w  — ( K  — L\)  is 
burnt, which implies /  =  0 and leads to Us =  A i\4 (l +  <J).
• This outcome is preferred to both the semi-separating one and the pooling 
one (when no money is burnt since the m onopolist’s utility increases with 
w  in both cases). This holds if and only if:
J <  x _  V,(l + S ) ~  (SV1/ L 1 -  M/VfcKL, - { K -  w) )
' -  V , ( l + S ) - ( 6 V , / L 1 - l ) ( L 1 - ( K - w ) )  1 >
A, >  V,IVh +  ( L i - ( K - w ) ) I V h( \ + 8 )  (26)
Ab increases with K ,  decreases with w  and equals 1 when L\  =  K  — w.
The result is obtained with Aa =  im,x{5Vi/[(SVil — Li)], Vi/Vh +  (L \  — ( K  —
w))/Vh( l + 5 ) } .  □
P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s i t io n  3:
The proof is similar to tha t of Proposition 2 with:
A' =  m x :f  W  V  . ( L i - ( K - w ) )
“ -  { 5Vh - ( L 1 - 8 L 2y V h +  U ( l  +  <*) } { ]
, =  V , ( l  + 5 ) -  [ W / j h  -  5 L 2) -  m v h} ( L ,  - ( K -  «,))
6 _  V, ( 1  +  8 ) - [ S V i / ( L 1 - 5 L 2 ) - 1 \ ( L 1 - ( K - w ) )
both decreasing with L2. □
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P r o o f  o f  P r o p o s i t io n  5:
Following Laffont and Tirole, we assume that the monopolist offers two con­
tracts in stage 1 : {<7°, T 0}  for the low valuation buyer and {9 1, T 1} for the high 
valuation one. Let x be the probability tha t a high valuation buyer chooses 
{ q ° , T 0}  and y  be the probability tha t a low valuation buyer chooses { q ° , T 0}. 
The updated probability tha t 0 =  Oh given tha t { q k, T k}  was chosen in stage 
1 , A*, satisfies:
\i  =  ________ x )_______________  (2 9 )
X1( l - x )  +  ( l - X 0(1 -  y) 1 j
A5 =   -----^  (30)
x X\ +  2 /(1 — ^ 1)
We solve the game by backward induction. In stage 2, the m onopolist’s 
program, offers and profit are those of the static case given A .^ In stage 1, the 
monopolist’s program can be written:
max{9o)To)(?i)Ti} Ai[a:(T0 -  cq°) +  (1 -  x ) ( T l -  cql )\
+(1 — A1 )[t/(X'0 — cq°) +  (1 — y ) ( T l — cq1)]
+ ^ /[ (^  i x +  (1  — A ^y)?^7^ )
+(Ai( l  — x)  -f ( 1  — Ai)(l — y ) ) n AI (X\)\ (31)
s. t.  ( I C h) 0hV W )  ~  T 1 +  S f U k(A|) >  0hV(q°)  -  T °  +  S f U k(X°2)
(.I C i ) 0iV(q°)  - T °  >  0 iV (q l ) -  T 1
( I R h) 0hV ( q l ) - T l +  5 f U i ( \ \ ) >  0
(IRi)  0 i V { q ° ) - T ° >  0
It is clear th a t (IRi) is binding. In the Laffont-Tirole setting, 3 cases may
arise: either only (ICh) is binding, or only (ICi) is binding or both bind.
It turns out th a t in our case either only (ICh) is binding or the solution is
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pooling. This difference arises because, in the Laffont-Tirole monopolist case, 
the isoprofit curves are strictly convex. So we have two types of equilibria.
In type I equilibrium, {ICh)  only is binding, so tha t the low valuation 
buyer strictly prefers { q ° , T 0}  and the high valuation buyer randomizes be­
tween { q ° , T 0}  and { q l , T 1}.  As a result, \ \  — 1 and A^  =  x \ i l [ x \ \  -f 1 — Ai]. 
Therefore, £/^(Aj) =  0 and the second period payoff to the monopolist is first 
best. W ith probability Ai(1 — z), 7r2 =  7r"4/( 1) =  7rf7. W ith the complemen­
tary  probability, (A°) =  >  0. The expected payoff to the
monopolist is:
n =  -  « / (A i ) )  +  (1 -  x){6hV{q{b) -  cq{b)}
- A . I A W ^ A , ) )  +  6fA0V(q?{\°2))} (32)
+ ( l - A 1)[e,K(9f6(A1) ) - c 9f6)]
+<S/[(Aix +  (1 -  A ^ t t ^ A " )  +  A,(1 -  x ) * ? }  (33)
Type II equilibrium is pooling. The best pooling equilibrium is such that
0iV'{qp) =  c, i.e. qp =  q {b and gives the monopolist a payoff:
II’, =  7rf +  «S./V4/(AI) (34)
The best type I equilibrium is separating with x =  0, yielding an expected
payoff:
+  J / K I - A O t ^ A S J  +  A ,* " ]  (35)
In this case, since A° =  0, we obtain, by denoting w^ 1 =  7rj4/(0):
n s =  n A,( \ 1 ) - S f \ 1 A 0 V ( q { b) 
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+  <S/[(1 -  A j ) ^ 7 +  Ai7rf7] (36)
By definition of 7t"4/ (Ai ), we have:
Al7r f '  +  (1 -  A,)*™ -  A 9\ iV(q{b) < n AI(X1) (37)
Otherwise, the optim al second best contract would not maximise the mo­
nopolist’s payoff in the static case. Using the same argum ent, it is clear tha t 
ttA/(A] ) >  7rf. Hence, n p <  n s if and only if:
tt? -  n A , (Xi) <  f / [ ( l  -  X1) 4 I +  A i T r f 7  -  A $ V ( q f i ) -  ^ ' ( A , ) ]  
tha t is if and only if:
s < _________________g * f ( A , ) - * r _________________
f [AeV(q{b) +  -  ( 1  -  A , K 7 -  A ^ f ' ]
Denoting the right hand side by So(f)  gives the result.
(38)
(39)
□
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